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RECLAIMING THE LABOR MOVEMENT THROUGH
UNION DUES? A POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE IN THE
MIRROR OF PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
Harry G. Hutchison*
The National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) seeming powerlessness to process dues
objector cases has led to a proliferation of state sponsored "paycheck protection" laws
and popular referenda devised to ensure that workers will not be obliged to pay dues for
non-germane purposes. Recently, California captured national attention as the site of a
richly contested paycheck protection referendum. Such proposals have electrified union
advocates and have enlivened the debate over the proper use of union dues. In addi-
tion, recent attempts to reform campaign finance have run aground on the thorny issue
of union political contributions (both in-kind and in cash). Concurrently, private sector
unions continue to decline in significance as agents of change within the workplace.
On the other hand, union influence within the political sector may be ascendant.
This Article inspects attempts to reclaim the labor movement and to enhance worker
solidarity through expansive interpretations of the social and political meaning of un-
ion dues. By investigating whether the interests and identities of individuals or
subgroups of workeAs are necessarily congruent with those of either the union majority or
union leadership and by disputing dominant free rider assumptions embedded in the
Taft-Hartley Act, this approach delegitimizes coerced transfers from union members and
dues payers for political and other purposes. Methodologically, the Article deploys post-
modern insights, group cooperation theory, and public choice theory to contest the
prevailing view that individuals and identifiable subgroups of workers must sacrifice
their particular interests and identities to the "greater totalizing goals of the working
class." While postmodernism has its critics, the author argues that an expansive de-
ployment of union dues to revitalize the union movement is inconsistent with the notion
that the individual has the right to decide the proper ends of her life. Accordingly, the
application of union dues to a variety of union efforts that are unrelated to collective
bargaining must inescapably be seen as promoting aform of subservience to authoritar-
ian unionist values, which would in turn submerge individual, ethnic, and gender
identity, and ideological diversity in support of hierarchical aims.
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INTRODUCTION
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of
property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a
uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the
first object of government. From the protection of different
and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of
different degrees and kinds of property immediately results;
and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views
of the respective proprietors ensues a division of the society
into different interests and parties.
-James Madison'
I. OVERVIEW
The interstices of the private sector employer-employee rela-
tionship continue to leave it vulnerable to a variety of competing
and often controversial claims. One bewildering aspect of this dis-
pute is the proper role of unions in a representative democracy.
2
Should unions be conceived as limited vehicles to both further self
government by workers oriented toward their own common eco-
nomic interest and eliminate industrial strife? 4 Or, on the other
hand, should unions be conceived as the robust engine of collec-
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), cited
in DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11307 (1989).
2. One observer contends that this issue exposes two contradictory themes within the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA): "The Wagner Act portion of the NLRA which is
framed in terms that arguably emphasize the value of associations in self-government ....
[and] the Taft-Hartley portion of the NLRA [which seems to place] a premium on personal
autonomy." Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our
First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of Debartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 149, 151-52
(footnotes omitted).
3. Viewed this way, "unions ... operate as mini-legislatures. Under this view, collec-
tive bargaining was conceived as a form of democratic self-government ... complete with
general legislative principles, including the principle of majority rule." Molly S. McUsic &
Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Workplace, 82 IowA L. REv. 1339,
1343-44 (1997).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994), cited inJamesJ. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and
the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1565 n.6 (1996); see also RESTORING THE
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 158, 180, 261 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994)
(noting that promoting industrial peace was one reason behind the passage of the labor
laws).
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tive insurgency against globalization, hierarchy, unwarranted man-
agement power, class-based injustice,' and increasing disparities in
income? Specifically, should labor unions focus on the limited col-
lective interest of workers, focusing on such issues as wages, hours,
and working conditions of a particular plant or employer? Or, al-
ternatively, should unions seek to redress perceived imbalances in
economic, social, and bureaucratic power 6 between employers and
workers in the pursuit of a "larger interest," namely, the transfor-
mation of the labor movement, the workplace, and the economic,
social, and political system of the country? If, labor unions con-
ceive their primary role as catalyst in the drive to improve the
"larger interest," are the interests of the individual worker or sub-
groups of workers advanced or impaired? To frame the question
in the postmodern idiom, should employees find their identity7
in a union that represents their economic interest in rebalancing
disparities in bargaining power in exchange for the compulsory
payment of dues, or in a union movement that transcends the
5. See George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15
BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 187, 193 (1994) (citing cases reflecting the liberal doctrine that
labor law only protects unions insofar as they limit their role to that of representative of the
employees of an individual employer and not of all workers in the fight for national class-
based justice).
6. For an argument in favor of this approach, see Brudney, supra note 4, at 1564-66.
Concern for subordination is grounded in considerations of both economic and social
power. Workers join bureaucratic organizations comprising a hierarchy of ranks of employ-
ees. Normally the consent of the parties legitimates any subordination so created by
contractual obligation. Bureaucracies impose subordination through hierarchical social
structure and disparities in economic power. This dual source of subordination has the
capacity to lead to worker abuse and to arbitrary employer actions. This may lead to reduc-
tions in individual dignity and autonomy. See Hugh Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power,
and the Contract of Employment, 15 INDUS. L. J. 1, 1-3 (1986); see also OTTO KAHN-FREUND,
LABOUR & THE LAW 51 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing that organized labor seeks to preserve "the
physical integrity and moral dignity of the individual"). On the other hand, another ob-
server grounds the benefits of freedom of contract in the avowed equality of bargaining
between workers and employer based on a concern for individual autonomy. See Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 948-55 (1984). Epstein fa-
vors less regulation of the employment relationship and would encourage contracts-at-will
(if the parties so choose) to minimize the potential for both employer and employee abuses.
Id.
7. o For a cautionary explication on appeals to group interest, group loyalty, and
group identity, see generally Harry Hutchison, From Bujumbura to Mogadishu: Ethnic Solidar-
ity, African Reality, American Implications, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 141, 159-67
(1997) (reviewing KEITH B. RiCHBURG, OUT OF AMERICA: A BLACK MAN CONFRONTS AF-
RICA) [hereinafter Hutchison, From Bujumbura to Mogadishu]; Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108
HARV. L. REv. 1003 (1995).
8. "Dues" as the term is used here refers to compulsory dues and fees paid to a union
as prescribed by the union security agreement in a collective bargaining agreement. A un-
ion must in theory represent all employee dues payers regardless of union membership.
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boundaries of craft, geography, nation-state, and narrowly pre-
scribed self-interest, 9 even if such a conception leads inevitably to
the subordination of individual or subgroup identities and monies
to group goals and group hierarchy?' l This query becomes even
more important given the persistence of the political influence"
and economic wealth 12 of unions despite profound declines in un-
ion membership. 3
A. Background-The Rise and Decline
in Union Membership
Unions flourished between 1935 and 1947.14 During that period,
unions empowered by the Norris La Guardia and Wagner Acts saw
To avoid "free riding" by nonmembers who receive benefits of union representation
but refuse to contribute to its costs, unions and employers usually negotiate either a
union shop clause requiring that represented employees join the union as a condi-
tion of continued employment, or an agency shop or fair share agreement, requiring
payment of certain dues and fees to the union.
Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector
Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1 n.2 (1989).
9. Indeed, it has been asserted (uncritically) that economic inequality creates the re-
quirement for collective action and of state intervention to protect it. Feldman, supra note
5, at 204. This begs the question: what is economic equality or inequality?
10. This of course raises the question of what constitutes a model group. For one view,
see Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 135 (1996).
11. See William J. Moore et al., The Political Influence of Unions and Corporations on COPE
Votes in the U.S. Senate, 1979-1988, 16J. LAB. RES. 203, 218-19 (1995) (revealing that the
available evidence fails to show a decline in the political influence of unions). In 1996, the
AFL-CIO "launched an overwhelmingly partisan $35 million 'voter education project,'
funded mainly with mandatory union dues, to defeat conservative members of the 104th
Congress" despite the fact that union members, in opposition to their leaders, split their
vote roughly sixty-forty between the two major political parties in 1994. Kenneth R. Wein-
stein & Thomas M. Wielgus, How Unions Deny Workers' Rights, The Heritage Foundation, at
http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/regulation/bg1087.html (July 18, 1996) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
12. From the period 1991 through 1995, for example, total receipts by several of the
major international unions which make up the AFL-CIO actually increased while member-
ship declined. Weinstein & Wielgus, supra note 11, at 5.
13. For instance " [ u] nion density as a percentage of private nonagricultural wage and
salary workers fell from 38% in 1954 to 11.5% in 1992." Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair,
Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 59 n.1
(1993).
14. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS AND THE NATIONAL LA-
BOR RELATIONS ACT 35 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
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union membership soar from three to fifteen million. 15 In some
heavily industrialized sectors, union membership comprised eighty
percent of the workforce.1 This vision of expansive labor union
power reached its apex when John L. Lewis conducted two pro-
longed and devastating strikes among coal miners during World
War I,' 7 when, in response to the postwar deregulation of wages
and prices in August 1945, "major unions immediately demanded
huge raises, thirty percent and more . .. [and] union leaders ...
threatened to shut the country down.""' Against this backdrop,
President Truman proposed a modest alteration of the nation's
labor laws.' 9 However, Congress had much tougher measures in
mind. Consequently, the Taft-Hartley Act was passed despite
Truman's veto in August 1947.20
In general, the Act shifted the emphasis of federal labor law
from simply a scheme protecting the rights of employees to organ-
ize and engage in concerted economic activities to a more
balanced scheme which placed certain restrictions on unions while
guaranteeing certain freedoms of speech and conduct to employ-
ers and individual workers.2 ' Among the more contentious
provisions are subsection 158(a) (3), which makes it an unfair la-
bor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment.., to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization,"22 but allows the creation of union




18. DAVID FRUM, WHAT'S RIGHT: THE NEW CONSERVATISM AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR
CANADA 84 (1996).
19. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 14, at 36.
20. Id. at 39. An important question is whether the Taft-Hartley Act contributed to the
decline in unionism or, on the contrary, whether it merely ratified an emerging industrial
orthodoxy. It must be admitted that ten years after the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act
union membership rose by more than three million. Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A
Slave-LaborLaw?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 764 (1998). In spite of that fact, it is asserted that
the Taft-Hartley Act was perhaps part of "a much larger social and political project whose
import extended well beyond the recalibration of the 'collective bargaining' mechanism."
Id. at 765. Instead, the law stands like a fulcrum upon which the entire New Deal order
teetered. "Before 1947 it was possible to imagine a continuing expansion and vitalization of
the New Deal impulse. After that date, however, labor and the left were forced into an in-
creasingly defensive posture." Id.
21. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 14, at 40. It was an attempt to con-
strain the labor movement, which some observers saw as "the most powerful, and the most
aggressive [labor movement] that the world has ever seen." Id. at 35.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1947); see also Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck,
487 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1988) (resolving a conflict regarding the interpretation of two provi-
sos within § 158(a) (3)).
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which define certain unfair labor union practices." The section
contains two provisos without which all union-security clauses
would fall within this otherwise broad condemnation. The first
states that nothing in the Act "preclude [s] an employer from mak-
ing an agreement with a labor organization... to require as a
condition of employment membership therein"2 4 thirty days after
the employee attains employment. The second provides that
no employer shall justify any discrimination against an em-
ployee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership
was not available to the employee on the same terms and
conditions generally applicable to other members or (B) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was
denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure.., to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.'
Despite these changes in the NLRA, which labor unions heavily
opposed as a form of "slave labor,"26 union membership remained
strong during the ensuing era. Nevertheless, since the late 1960s,
union membership and union leverage have experienced a rather
sharp decline. 7
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)-(2) (1994); see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra
note 14, at 1495-96. These additions to the NLRA preclude union restraint or coercion of
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 and outlaw union-sponsored
employer discrimination against employees in violation of section 8(a) (3), as well as outlaw-
ing union discrimination with respect to union membership. Section 158(b) (2) declares it
to be
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents... to cause or attempt
to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection
8(a) (3) of this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied ... on some ground other than
his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 14, at 1495 n.31.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3).
26. See, e.g., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 14, at 46.
27. See Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12 LAB.
LAW 117, 117 (1996) (noting that the unionization rate has plummeted from thirty-five to
twelve percent of the private sector workforce from the mid-1950s and is likely to fall fur-
ther) (citation omitted); see also Charles Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The
Inadequacy of Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1616, 1616 (1995)
(predicting that the private sector union density rate may fall to five percent by the end of
this decade) (citation omitted).
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Now, more than sixty years after the enactment of the NLRA, a
growing number of labor sympathizers lament the hard times ex-
28perienced by unions. This decline has been caused by, among
other things, structural change within the economy, enhanced
global competition, and important social factors.2 9 For instance,
workers increasingly enticed by an "expressive individualism,"
0
0
which focuses on subjective self-realization, are less likely to find
attractive any collective action that requires individual interests to
yield to group interest and group solidarity. This diminishes de-
mand for unionism3 ' and emphasizes the notion that each
individual has the right to decide the proper ends of her life.
One commentator concludes that "collective action appears
moribund. Current analysis burying and praising the NLRA has
focused primarily on the changed economic realities of the prod-
uct and labor markets... [while] changes in federal workplace law
over the past thirty years have undermined the concept of group
action .... " Furthermore, he suggests that "the diminished legal
role for group action in labor relations is in part a function of the
diminished power of unions in an economy increasingly subject to
28. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for
Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1988); RobertJ. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer,
Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
953, 954-69 (1991); Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1016-21 (1991).
29. Among the catalog of plausible reasons why unions have declined are the follow-
ing: (1) "American workers born after World War II are less inclined to favor collective and
statist solutions," Estreicher, supra note 27, at 118; (2) unions "operate in less friendly ter-
rain" given the shrinking manufacturing sector and the growth of the service sector, id.; (3)
plant relocation decisions from the Rust-Belt to the southern part of the United States; and
(4) the remedial deficiencies of the labor laws. See id. More controversially, Estreicher as-
serts that the principal cause of labor's decline lies in the fact that "the model of employee
organization promoted by the labor laws has failed to keep pace with the unleashing of
competitive forces in product markets as a result of deregulation, technological advances,
and global competition." Id.
30. "Expressive individualism" holds that each person has a unique core of feelings
and intuition that unfold or are expressed for individuality to be actualized. Sharon Rabin
Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Canse for Labor's Decline, in
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS
TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 50TH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR 41, 41-49 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998). It has little to do with the
acquisition of material possessions. See id.
31. Id.
32. Brudney, supra note 4, at 1563; Gottesman, supra note 13, at 61-62 (suggesting
that the vast majority of American workers likely would not embrace collective bargaining
even if bargaining was free from all of its present legal infirmities); cf Joel Rogers, Reforming
U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 97-100 (1993) (condemning the legal struc-
ture of labor relations as outdated and ill-suited to both workers and management). See
generally WILLIAM B. GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELA-
TIONSHIPS AND THE LAW (1993).
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global competition and rapid technological change ... [and]





This deterioration in union organizing power has arguably been
encouraged by the vigorous opposition of business interests, which
successfully lobbied for the Taft-Hartley Act,34 and has been exac-
erbated by court decisions, popular referenda,36  and state
legislation.37 These actions by the legislative and judicial branches
of government, as well as the electorate, signify "that collective
bargaining has become an anachronistic means of promoting em-
ployee interests,"38 that leads inexorably to the "loss of legitimacy
for unions as the enablers of group action."39
33. Brudney, supra note 4, at 1564.
34. See Craver, supra note 27, at 1620. For a detailed examination of how Congress and
the courts have arguably diminished group action over the past thirty years, see Brudney,
supra note 4, at 1564-87.
35. See Brudney, supra note 4, at 1572-91; see, e.g., Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S.
527, 531-41 (1992) (holding that nonemployee union access rights need not be accommo-
dated unless the workplace is otherwise inaccessible); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. 105, 106-12 (1956); Cf JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN
LABOR LAW 93 (1983) (condemning court decisions which stress property rights and ac-
cordingly justify limitations on union access to workers). But cf Harry G. Hutchison,
Through the Pruneyard Coherently: Resolving the Collision of Private Property Rights and Nonem-
ployee Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1994) (arguing in favor of access
limitations) [hereinafter Hutchison, Through the Pruneyard Coherently].
36. See, e.g., Jodi Wilogren, NLRB Chief Scolded for Prop. 226 Stand, The Los ANGELES
TIMES, May 7, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, Los Angeles Times File (discussing
Proposition 226 "which would prevent unions from spending dues on politics without
member's permission.")
37. The Governor of Wyoming signed his state's "paycheck protection" law in March
1998. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-102 (Michie 1999). Idaho only allows employers to deduct
political contributions from worker paychecks after the worker has given her permission in
writing for each calendar year. IDAHO CODE § 67-6605 (Michie Supp. 2000). All workers in
Washington are protected by the state's paycheck protection law, enacted with the passage
of Initiative 134 in 1992, which protects private sector employees from involuntary paycheck
deductions for political purposes. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42-17 (West 2000). In Ohio,
"paycheck protection" was enacted in 1995, but after legal challenges, only took effect in
1998 and prohibits public employers in the state from withholding political funds from
their employees. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.031 (West 2000). Michigan's "paycheck
protection" measure protects Michigan workers by precluding employer deductions of
political action committee funds without annual written authorization. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 169.225(6) (2000). This summary of referenda and legislation is based on an Americans
for Tax Reform press release available at http://www.atr.org/paycheck/
pp0006.html (last visitedJune 15,1999) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). A California "paycheck protection" initiative failed to win approval following a
vigorous campaign by labor in 1998. See Donald Lambro, Big Labor Revs Up to Kill Union-Dues
Initiative in California, WASH. TIMES, May 17, 1998, at A2.
38. Brudney, supra note 4, at 1564.
39. Id. In addition, Brudney argues that the NLRA, by choosing group action, reduces
certain individual values to secondary status. Id. at 1565.
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B. Responding to the Decline in Union
Power at the Workplace
Given the degeneration in union power and influence in the
workplace (if not in politics), and the growing allure of collective
action to commentators, if not to workers, a variety of proposals
for pro-labor union action have arisen. The methods advocated to
revitalize union membership include enlargement of "workplace
democracy," 40 the intensification of collective bargaining through
increased access to and use of the workplace for employee self-
organization and concerted activity,4' the democratization of
firms through a "systematic program of egalitarian market
reconstruction , the boosting of the minimum wage, and most
notably for our purposes, the redeployment of union dues
44
40. See Klare, supra note 28, at 3-7. Klare seeks to expand the reconstruction logic of
the New Deal labor law system beyond its self-imposed limits. Id. Instead, the NLRA should
be reconceived as a vehicle to mobilize democracy systematically on virtually all aspects of
the employment relationship.
41. See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 633 (1991); Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and En-
richment of Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689, 704-08 (calling
for, among other things, broadened access to private property by nonemployees). But see
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
LAND-USE REGULATION 9-12 (1997); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTI-
TUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETY 81 (1987) (stating
that the Supreme Court has failed to protect property rights); Hutchison, Through The
Pruneyard Coherently, supra note 35, at 41-44.
42. Klare, supra note 28, at 23.
43. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act: The Minimum Wage: Hearing of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 35-48 (1995) (statement of Richard Trumka, on
behalf of the AFL-CIO), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, ALLNEWS File. But see Harry
Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes: Exploding the
Power of Myth, Fantasy, and Hierarchy, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 93, 119-26 (1997) (reviewing
unions' historical motive for backing minimum wage) [hereinafter, Hutchison, Toward a
Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes].
44. Notably,
[n]ot all workers represented by unions pay dues and fees voluntarily; many are re-
quired to do so as a condition of keeping their jobs. Private sector unions operating
outside the twenty-one "right-to-work" states generally negotiate with the employer
for some type of contractual union security device. A clause requiring union
"membership" as a condition of continued employment is most common.
Jennifer Friesen, The Costs of "Fee Speech"-Restrictions on the Use of Union Dues to Fund New Organ-
izing, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 606 (1988). Agency shops decline to make employment
conditional upon union membership; instead, employees must contribute payments equal to
those required of union members. See FLORIAN BARTOSIC & ROGER C. HARTLEY, LABOR RELA-
TIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 420 (2d ed. 1986); Heidi Marie Werntz, Comment, Waiver
ofBeck Rights and Resignation Rights: Infusing the Union Member Relationship with Individualized
Commitment, 43 CATH. U.L. REv. 159, 161 n.7 (1993).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
as a vehicle for reclaiming the vitality of the labor movement.15
Many commentators, outraged by the decline in unionization,
do not think union dues should primarily inure to the benefit the
workers who pay them.46 To the contrary, they imagine union dues
principally as a vehicle for economic, political, social, national, and
workplace transformation that strengthens union organizing clout
and bargaining power.47 However poignant the call for redeploying
union dues in the service of change, the claim that they should be
a vehicle for revitalizing the labor movement and for reclaiming
collective action has been unevenly supported. On the one hand,
the U.S. Supreme Court has forcefully declared that union dues
are properly spent to attain the limited collective goal of improved
hours, working conditions, and wages.8 On the other hand, de-
spite this decision, employee Beck rights49 have not been enforced
uniformly by the National Labor Relations Board5 ° (NLRB) or the
President of the United States. 5
45. Werntz, supra note 44, at 193-207 (1993) (articulating the value of dues to the
continued vitality of the labor movement).
46. See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 44, at 603-04 (arguing that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion precluding unions from funding organizing activities undermines national labor policy
and is notjustified by either the federal labor statutes or the First Amendment).
47. See id. at 645-46.
48. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762-63 (1988). The
proper allocation of union dues has been the subject of litigation both under the NLRA
and the Railway Labor Act (RLA). See, e.g., Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S.
435, 447-48 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (holding
state government employees have a constitutional right to object to their "required service
fees" being used to fund various union activities); Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S.
113, 117 (1963) (repeating the jury's finding that the union cannot use monies extracted
under collective agreement for purposes not reasonably necessary or related to collective
bargaining); Perry v. Local Lodge 2569, 708 F.2d 1258, 1259 (7th Cir. 1983) (regarding an
employee who "refused to pay [agency shop] fees ... spent on matters not related to the
Union's duties as collective bargaining representative"); Reid v. Int'l Union, 479 F.2d 517,
518 (10th Cir. 1973) (stating that the employees alleged that over their objections the union
wrongfully spent agency fees for political and ideological purposes); Reid v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d. 408, 409 (10th Cir. 1971) (explaining that the court must deter-
mine whether it has jurisdiction to hear dispute over whether union may spend dues for
political purposes over the objections of nonmembers).
49. See discussion infta Part II.A-D.
50. Robert Hunter, Compulsoy Union Dues in Michigan: The Need to Enforce Union Mem-
bers' Rights, and the Impact on Workers, Employers, and Labor Unions 12, May 1997, Mackinac
Center for Pub. Pol'y (arguing that the NLRB has operated at a "snail's pace" in enforcing
Beck protections); see also Editorial, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 2, 1998, at A22 (stating that
the NLRB "has a funny way of doing its job. Seven out of eight cases languishing on its
docket involve workers trying to reclaim union dues extorted for political purposes... 13 of
the board's 20 oldest cases ... are so-called Beck cases") (emphasis added).
51. President Clinton rescinded President Bush's executive order as "distinctly anti-
union." Hunter, supra note 50, at 13. President Bush's Executive Order 12,800 proposed to
provide information to "employees working for federal contractors that they have individual
rights and discretion to control union political contributions generated from dues." Id. at
12. The order mandated the posting of a notice regarding the payment of fees to the union
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Resistance to enforcement of Beck rights has led to several recent
state initiatives, Congressional bills, and other proposals to facili-
tate the enforcement of Beck rights.5 1 Such efforts have generated
widespread condemnation from many commentators, including
William Gould (the outgoing NLRB Chairman), who asserts that
efforts aimed at helping workers to limit their dues payments are
"'deeply flawed' on constitutional and policy grounds." s
C. The Postmodern/Public Choice View
Both a majority of union workers and the American public op-
pose the use of union dues for political purposes,54 as reflected by
referenda and legislation limiting the uses of union dues as well as
criticism of the influence of labor in national PolitiCS. 5 Given this
political context, it is an opportune moment to examine the de-
bate over union dues from a postmodern/public choice
perspective.
1. A Postmodern View-As the dominant union ideology has dis-
integrated both culturally and within the workplace, the urge to
"move from integration, or a collective identity, to separatism, or
56
more defined individualizing identities" has taken center stage.
in "all places where notices to employees are customarily posted." Exec. Order No. 12,800,
57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (Apr. 13, 1992), repealed by Exec. Order 12,836 (Feb. 1, 1992). President
Clinton's decision may reflect his "considerable political debt to organized labor... " Es-
treicher, supra note 27, at 120.
52. See, e.g., Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. (1997); Worker
Right to Know Act, H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996); see also Robert Hunter, Paycheck Protection
in Michigan: A Proposal to Safeguard Union Workers' Wages and Freedom of Speech, Sept. 1998,
Mackinac Center for Pub. Pol'y 9-11 (discussing various state paycheck protection efforts).
53. Hunter, supra note 52, at 6. Chairman Gould was accused of, among other things,
the posting by the NLRB on its website the highlights of his criticism of a California Initia-
tive, Proposition 226, that would grant "paycheck protection" to California union dues
payers. This conduct drew bipartisan criticism. SeeJodi Wilgoren, NLRB Chief Scolded for Prop.
226 Stand, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1998, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library File, Los Angeles
Times File.
54. See Joe Knollenberg, The Changing of the Guard: Republicans Take on Labor and the
Use of Mandatory Dues or Fees for Political Purposes, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 347, 349 n.14 (1998)
(stating that one poll found that fifty-three percent of union households and sixty-three
percent of the general public agree that unions should not be allowed to use members'
dues for political purposes).
55. See id. at 347. The Center for Responsive Politics reports that seven of the largest
ten contributors to the 1996 federal campaigns were labor unions. In the News: Paycheck
Protection Facts, at http://www.atr.org/archives/issues/i0021.htm (last visitedJune 15, 1999)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform.)
56. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1351.
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This trend 7 toward separatism is consistent with the views of the
dues objectors in Communications Workers of America v. Beck 5s and
other cases and with the emerging lack of consensus among work-
ers concerning the benefits of unionism. 59 This trend is indicative
of the transition from a utilitarian individualism grounded solely
in pecuniary rewards toward "expressive individualism," which en-
tails the creation of a larger list of individual rights and a larger
space for personal autonomy.
60
"In the employment context, the ill fit between the collective
bargaining regime and the identities of women and people of
color have led some to conclude that unions did not, and perhaps
cannot, represent their interest."61 In light of the exclusionary
62
policies of the majority of labor unions, the notion that unions are
one community comprising "diverse groups is, for many, a concept
that appears inherently coercive and infused with notions of
domination."63 Given the "failure of unions to represent the inter-
ests of nontraditional groups as well as the larger failure of class-
based communities ... some scholars ... call for multiple repre-
sentative structures in the workplace as a replacement for a
57. This move toward fragmentation and separation is not an entirely recent devel-
opment. For example, William Gould, former chairman of the NLRB, at one time
advocated intervention by civil rights groups on behalf of racial minorities in labor arbitra-
tion proceedings. See William Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial
Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40,61 n.81, 64 (1969).
58. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
59. One observer concedes that workers do not necessarily accept conventional un-
ions as the best vehicle for the advancement of their interest.
In their preferences for how an ideal employee organization should be structured,
workers diverge sharply from the union model in some respects-again reflecting
their perceptions that management cooperation is essential. By an overwhelming
86% to 9% margin, workers want an organization run jointly by employers and man-
agement, rather than an independent employee-run organization. By a smaller, but
still sizable margin of 52% to 34%, workers want an organization to be staffed and
funded by the company, rather than independently through employee contribu-
tions.
Estreicher, supra note 27, at 118 n.2 (citing PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES,
WORKER REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION SURVEY: REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 49
(1994)).
60. See Margalioth, supra note 30, at 48-49.
61. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1351.
62. See AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTr RUDWICK, BLACK DETROIT AND THE RISE OF THE
UAW 3 (1994) (pointing out that since the turn of the century, the mainstream of the labor
movement, the AFL unions and the Railway Brotherhood, have generally excluded blacks
or restricted them to Jim Crow units); Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception
of Minimum Wage Regimes, supra note 43, at 118-34.
63. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1351.
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broader unified organizational structure." 4 Such scholars argue
that instead of a single union hegemonically "representing the in-
terest of workers, workers should organize at the workplace in
whatever group identity they are most comfortable [with] and
where their interests are most likely to be furthered.,
65
While voices of caution have been raised against the ascendant
preference for fragmented worker representation, 6 and while one
set of commentators suggests "that labor unions can function as a
source ... [of] cosmopolitan renaissance, 67 the historical ten-
dency of unions has been to suppress particular identities and
interests of workers in support of the "universal worker., 68 Post-
modernism insistently challenges the legitimacy of this result.
2. Public Choice in the Mirror of Postmodernism--"The fact of scar-
city, which exists everywhere, guarantees that people will compete
for resources. .Markets are one way to organize and channel this
competition. Politics is another. People use both markets and poli-
tics to get resources allocated to the ends they favor."
6 9
Premised on economic evaluation, public choice is also known
as the interest group theory of legislation. It posits that "legislation
is a good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that
legislative protection flows to those groups which derive the great-
est value from it, regardless of overall social welfare., 7 Thus, "all
citizens are both demanders and suppliers of laws, but certain citi-
zens share legislative goals with highly organized interest groups
that provide them with an advantage over other citizens in the
64. Id. at 1352.
65. Id; cf. McAdams, supra note 7, at 1007 (stating that social groups are based on
demographic traits such as race, gender, or age). Social groups based on demographic traits
may give rise to what can be called predominantly "affective-oriented groups." Vernon J.
Dixon, Some Thoughts on Teaching Predominantly Affective-Orientated Groups, in INTRODUCING
RACE AND GENDER INTO ECONOMICS 177, 177-89 (Robin L. Bartlett ed., 1997). Affective-
oriented groupings may reflect the view that "[w]hatever happens to the individual happens
to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual."
Id. at 178-79.
66. See McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1353; see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The
Feeble Strength of One: Why Individual Worker Rights Fail, 14 AM. PROSPECT 60, 60 (1993)
(arguing that increased statutory protection for individual workers undermines unions and
the strength of collective bargaining).
67. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1341.
68. Id. at 1343, 1346-49.
69. Richard L Stroup, Political Behavior, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOM-
ICS 45, 45 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993).
70. Jonathan R. Macey, Book Review, Public Choice, Public Opinion, and the Fuller Court:
The ChiefJusticeship of Melville W Fuller, 1888-1910, 49 VAND. L. REV. 373, 375 (1996) (citing
Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982)).
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procurement of favorable legal rules."7' As one public choice
scholar avers: "[p] olitics is a structure of complex exchange among
individuals, a structure within which persons seek to secure collec-
tively their own privately defined objectives that cannot be
efficiently secured through simple market exchanges.
72
This viewpoint demands skepticism of the "benefits" of propos-
als put forward by interest groups, including unions and their
academic advocates. Public choice theory suggests that the policies
and legislation advocated by such groups may not be in the larger
interest.
When people form, join or simply pay dues to an interest
73group in furtherance of the "greater good," collective action
problems such as free riding and forced riding may result from
conflicting preferences among members of the group. Individuals
• 74
can be members of more than one group at the same time, and
may have significantly different, even antithetical, viewpoints from
one another. Discord may also occur regarding whether the puta-
tive benefits accrue evenly to all constituents of the group.75
76If unions are conceived as representative structures, will the at-
tempt by unions and labor advocates to enlarge both the amount
of union dues and the collective uses to which they can be put
plausibly benefit all workers as individuals or as members of identi-
fiable subgroups of the union, or even society as a whole?
71. Macey, supra note 70, at 375-76.
72. James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 103, 107-08 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds.,
1988). This view can be seen in contradistinction to the perspective of some public choice
scholars who seem to believe that self-interest simply means avaricious greed in a simple
monetary sense. At least two scholars in their examination of public choice investigate the
role of self-interest in politics by asserting that self-interest can be separated from ideologi-
cal/nonmaterial considerations. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 7 (1991).
In my view, the attempted separation of ideology from self-interest has not been proven.
Cf McAdams, supra note 7, at 1007 (noting that "[g]roups use intra-group status rewards as
a non-material means of gaining material sacrifice from members").
73. While unions conceived of as mini-legislatures are subject to the application of
public choice insights in terms of internal decision making, unions also have an external
dimension as well: acting as a pressure group attempting to achieve collective objectives in a
contest with other actors and interest groups within the polity.
74. See Posner, supra note 10, at 161. For instance, a woman may be a member of a
family in which she is the mother, a member of a charitable organization, a union local, and
a church group. Each group provides benefits which may overlap and impose costs and
other obligations. See id.
75. See infra Part IV.C. (discussing forced riders).
76. Under the influence of Archibald Cox, courts initially conceptualized the labor re-
lationship as a form of representative government. See McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1343
n.12.
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D. Developing a Postmodern/Public Choice View
Part II of this Article evaluates the worker's right to avoid paying
dues grounded in Beck, and briefly appraises the response to the
Beck line of decisions. Part III develops a postmodern conception
of unions, which challenges insistent claims of solidarity. Part IV
extends the prevailing perception of free riding upon which the
logic of coerced dues conscription is established, by examining
whether individuals or subgroups who are compelled to sacrifice
their particular interests to the "greater totalizing goals of the
working class"7 are in fact free riders, or to the contrary, forced rid-
ers.7 This perspective delegitimizes coerced transfers of union
members' dues for hierarchical or majoritarian political purposes.
This Article seeks to establish that continuing union claims of
solidarity and cooperation may be incompatible with both indi-
viduated and group claims to identity. By creating a hypothetical
model of mandatory dues payments as applied to a range of arche-
typal workers, the author investigates the interplay between public
choice, group cooperation and postmodernism. 79 Additionally, the
author argues that an expansive deployment of union dues for the
purpose of revitalizing the union movement is inconsistent with
the notion that the individual has the right to determine the
proper ends of her life. .0
Accordingly, the application of mandatory union dues to broad
political causes must be seen as a form of majoritarian exploitation
which submerges individual, ethnic, and gender identity in sup-
port of hierarchical aims which do not necessarily advance the
interests of either individuals or subgroups of workers, or enhance
the greater good.
77. Id. at 1342.
78. Elementary public choice theory suggests that collective action can give rise to
both forced riders and free riders. A forced rider is a person or group compelled to subsi-
dize benefits, which accrue primarily to others. A forced rider is the opposite of a free rider
who receives benefits without fully paying for them. See ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOM-
ICS AND BEHAVIOR 625 (1997); MUELLER, supra note 1, at 308.
79. See infra Part IV.D.
80. See infra Part W.E.
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II. BECK AND THE RESPONSE TO BECK AND SIMILAR DECISIONS
A. The Beck Decision
In 1988 the U.S. Supreme Court reshaped the National Labor
Relations Board's statutory mandate when it held "for the first time
... that the Taft-Hartley Act right not to engage in concerted ac-
tivities for mutual aid and protection includes the right not to
support certain union activities financed by compulsory union
dues."8  Instead, the Court held that unions are not "free to exact
dues equivalents from nonmembers in any amount they please, no
matter how unrelated those fees may be to collective-bargaining
activities. 82 The Supreme Court's decision in Beck is a logical ex-
pansion of its "fee speech" doctrine first applied to preclude the
use of dues to finance political candidates and causes that were
opposed by individuals and subgroups of workers.83 As one com-
mentator notes, this "decision was hardly remarkable because the
NLRB balances the union majority's right to 'full freedom of asso-
ciation' for purposes of collective bargaining and other mutual aid
and protection with the minority's right to refrain from such asso-
ciation.
8 4
In Beck, twenty employees who had declined union membership
brought a suit challenging the use of their agency fees for pur-
poses other than collective bargaining, contract administration,
grievance adjustment, and representational activities s5 The Court
confronted the contention that the expenditure of a portion of
nonmember union dues for such purposes as organizing the em-
ployees of other employers, lobbying for labor legislation, and
participating in social, charitable, and political events is a violation
of the union's duty of fair representations, section 8(a) (3) of the
81. Hartley, supra note 8, at 1 (citing Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735, 744-54 (1988)).
82. Beck 487 U.S. at 759.
83. See Friesen, supra note 44, at 609; see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 764 (1961). The Supreme Court's "fee speech" doctrine can be broken down into its
statutory and constitutional components. Statutory analysis relies primarily on the Court's
view of the Railway Labor Act and the NLRA. Friesen, supra note 44, at 609-10. Constitu-
tional inquiry rests on issues of freedom of speech and freedom of association. Id. at 608-
10. Three questions might arise in a dispute over how union dues can be spent: 1) whether
it is authorized by union membership; 2) whether it is authorized or prohibited by statute;
and 3) whether it is allowed or prohibited by the constitution. Id. at 605 n.11.
84. Hartley, supra note 8, at 1.
85. Beck, 487 U.S. at 739-40.
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NLRA, and the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 6 While conced-
ing that section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA permits a collective
bargaining agreement that compels all bargaining unit employees
to pay periodic union dues and initiation fees as a condition of
continued employment;s7 that such a provision applies whether or
not the employee wishes to become a union member;ss that the
union as exclusive bargaining representative enjoys broad author-
ity in the negotiations and administration of the collective
bargaining contract; 9 the Court nevertheless reasoned such
authority must be tempered by the union's "statutory obligation to
serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimina-
tion."90 While the Court rather effortlessly concluded that the
defendant's policy violated the judicially created duty of fair repre-
sentation, it failed to decide the plaintiffs' First Amendment
claim.9'
Moreover, the claims that such a policy also violated section
8(a) (3) of the NLRA were rather, controversially, subject to sec-
tion 7 or section 8 of the NLRA, thus leading the Court, in
general, to defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB.2 Nev-
ertheless, the Court concluded that it was not prevented from
deciding the merits of "the § 8(a)(3) claim ... insofar as such a
decision was necessary to the disposition of respondents' duty-of-
fair-representation challenge." 93 Hence, a divided Court sustained
the plaintiffs' duty of fair representation claim and constrained the
union's capacity to expend nonmember dues on activities other
than "core" union activities (those activities germane to collective
bargaining) .9" Consequently, the Court limited the use of mandatory
86. Beck, 487 U.S. at 740. The possibility that compulsory union payments interfere
with employee First Amendment interests remains alive. See generally Hartley, supra note 8.
87. Beck, 487 U.S. at 744-45.
88. Id. at 744.
89. Id. at 739.
90. Id. (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)).
91. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 740-42. First Amendment claims can be grounded in among
other things, the notion of coerced association that union membership requires. Union
security agreements, at the union request, allow the discharge of workers and are generally
held permissible under the First Amendment because of the governmental interest in pre-
cluding free riding. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977); Ry.
Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956); Friesen, supra note 44, at 607.
92. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 742 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236,245 (1959)).
93. Beck, 487 U.S. at 743. Significantly, the dissent could not agree with the majority of
the Court's resolution of the section 8(a) (3) issue. The dissent asserts that without refer-
ence to the Railway Labor Act and a case arising under it, the Court could not reach the
conclusion that the federal courts, as opposed to the NLRB, have jurisdiction in at least
some instances to resolve the section 8(a) (3) issues. Id. at 763.
94. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 762-63.
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union dues to the pursuit of the limited collective interest in the
collective bargaining and exclusive representation of workers in
their particular employment context.
95
B. Beck's Free Riding Analysis
The Supreme Court's analysis of the free rider problem within
the collective bargaining context illustrates the twin purposes that
the Taft-Hartley Act was intended to accomplish:
On the one hand, the most serious abuses of compulsory un-
ionism were eliminated by abolishing the closed shop. On the
other hand, Congress recognized that in the absence of a un-
ion-security provision "many employees sharing the benefits
of what unions are able to accomplish by collective bargain-
ing will refuse to pay their share of the cost.
96
Thus, in an attempt at balancing, the Court held that dues that
do not contribute, and which are not intended to contribute to the
cost of the operation of a "union in its capacity as collective-
bargaining agent cannot be justified as necessary for the elimina-
tion of 'free riders.' ,97
The concern of both the Court and Congress for the free rider
problem was made apparent in their confined solution. Part IV
presents a more sophisticated conception of the free rider prob-
lem derived from the literature of public choice and group
cooperation and suggests that Congress and the courts have not
fully dealt with the potential abuses of compulsory unionism. The
next subsection, however, examines the constraints under which
union dues objectors are forced to operate.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 749 (citing with approval NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-
41 (1962)). The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act demonstrates Congressional con-
cern that the beneficiaries of union negotiated benefits must contribute their fair share of
costs incurred in achieving those benefits. See, e.g., Beck, 487 U.S. at 749 n.5 (citing 93 CONG.
Rac. 3,447 (1947) (remarks of Rep.Jennings); 93 CONG. REc. 3,558 (remarks of Rep. Robi-
son); and 93 CONG. REc. 3,837 (remarks of Sen. Taft)). Indeed, none recognized this issue
more clearly than the leaders of organized labor, who thus sought to limit free riding. Id.
(citing S. RaP. at 6, reprinted in LEG. HIST. 412). Similar free rider concerns encouraged
Congress to amend the Railway Labor Act. Id. at 750.
97. Teamsters Local No. 959, 167 N.L.R.B. 1042, 1045 (1967), cited in Beck, 487 U.S. at
752, but subsequently repudiated by the NLRB in Detroit Mailers Union No. 40, 192
N.L.R.B. 951,952 (1971).
[VOL. 33:4
Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues? 465
C. Limiting the Application of Beck
Despite the impact of the Beck decision, its impact is limited.
First, while "workers cannot be forced under union contracts to
pay any dues or fees beyond those necessary for the performance
of the union's employee representation duties,"98 unions routinely
compel dues objectors to resign their membership. 9 In this event,
dues objectors must continue to pay for representation rights, but
are deprived of the ability to influence union governance. '°° De-
pending on the member's level of participation, she can influence
critical decisions, strategies, and goals for negotiation, the en-
forcement of the collective bargaining agreement, and the
selection of grievances for arbitration. Furthermore, many objec-
tors must forgo other badges of union membership such as
participation in strike votes, ratification or rejection of contract
terms, and union elections."° In effect, a dues objector must con-
front a Hobson's choice: exercise her democratic union rights
grounded in her economic interests, or exercise her Beck rights,
premised on her ideological desire to refrain from subsidizing
98. Hunter, supra note 52, at 3. By contrast, most paycheck protection proposals
would allow union members to object to noncore expenditures without resigning. Accord-
ingly, such proposals would preserve objectors' governance rights. See id. at 8.
99. Id. at 5. In reality the question of resignation from membership seems a bit con-
fused with regard to NLRA, RLA, and constitutional cases. Judge Murnahan cast what has
been called the deciding and concurring vote in the Fourth Circuit's Beck decision. See Beck
v. Communications Workers of Am., 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc). He seemed to
limit his rationale to nonunion, involuntary fee payers although the other five judges sup-
porting the judgment were not clear on this point. See Beck 800 F.2d at 1287 n.10; Friesen,
supra note 44, at 620-21 n.57. In addition, Justice Brennan's opinion affirming the lower
court characterized the beneficiaries of the doctrine disallowing dues payments for objec-
tors as "dues paying nonmember employees." Beck, 487 U.S. at 748; see also Friesen, supra
note 44, at 620-21 n.57. One observer notes that: "By framing the issue as whether the
'financial core' includes the obligation to support certain union activities, the Court seems
to assume that the union's duty runs only to nonmembers and not to members. Only non-
members are associated with the union through the compulsion of union security." Hartley,
supra note 8, at 10 n.34.
For a summary of the Supreme Court's views with regard to Railway Labor and constitu-
tional cases, see Friesen, supra note 44, at 620-21 n.57.
In addition, it is possible to contend that the obligation to pay full union dues might
conceivably survive a resignation where an individual has waived her right to revoke her
dues check-off authorization. See Werntz, supra note 44, at 163-64.
100. See Hunter, supra note 52, at 5-6.
101. See id. As one observer notes, "[i]n 1991, the Fourth Circuit for the first time di-
rectly answered whether a worker could pay only for collective bargaining and still remain a
member of the union. The Court answered this in the negative." Knollenberg, supra note
54, at 365 (footnote omitted); see Kidwell v. Transp. Communications Int'l Union, 946 F.2d
283, 293 (4th Cir. 1991).
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objectionable activities."' As such, unions and union leaders may
discover that their accountability is vitiated as dues objectors who
resign no longer matter for purposes of union governance.103
Second, potential dues objectors must clear several hurdles, in-
cluding the depletion of their own dues by labor union leaders, to
contest federal and state sponsored "paycheck protection" propos-
als that would give life to their Beck rights,10 4  information
constraints,0 5 and the sclerotic reluctance of the NLRB to process
dues objector cases. 0 6 In addition, just as whites and blacks in the
Jim Crow South faced social sanction and violence for failing to
102. Several witnesses before the House Employer-Employee Relations Subcommittee
expressed disappointment with the choice to join the union and gain valuable workplace
rights or to resign and lose any rights which they had. See Knollenberg, supra note 54, at
366-67.
103. For some observers, the need for action on the enforcement of Beck rights is com-
pounded by the fact that NLRB has operated at a snail's pace in enforcing such rights. See
Hunter, supra note 50, at 12. For an argument that the dues check-off provision contained
in many collective bargaining agreements constitutes independent grounds for the payment
of union dues which may trump Beck rights, see Werntz, supra note 44, at 159-67.
Moreover, individuals who exercise their right to resign from the union may face threats
to life, to family, and run a gauntlet of intimidation, insults, and coercion. See Knollenberg,
supra note 54, at 366.
104. For instance, financial figures released showed that the largely labor union oppo-
nents of California's Paycheck Protection Proposition 226 spent nearly twenty million
dollars while proponents spent $2.1 million. The press release suggests that labor union
dues largely financed the efforts of opponents of the initiative. Press Release, Project 21,
Blacks Say Labor Union Behavior is Best Reason for "Paycheck Protection," at
http://www.Project21.org (May 28, 1998) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform); see also Lambro, supra note 37 (reporting that labor leaders and Democratic
Party officials step up attacks on initiative and union officials vowed to spend whatever it
takes).
105. For instance, only nineteen percent of union members are aware that they have
the right to object to their union's use of their dues for political purposes. Hunter, supra
note 52, at 4 (stating that most workers are unaware that Beck rights exists); see also Knollen-
berg, supra note 54, at 349; Greg Pierce, Unions No Longer Required to Reveal Political Funding,
WASH. TiMES,Jan. 12, 1994, at A8 (reporting that the United States Labor Department has
eliminated a Bush administration requirement that unions reveal how much they spend on
political activities-information that may have been helpful to workers trying to get their
noncore dues returned). But see Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 292, 294
(1998) (holding that a union does not breach its duty of fair representation by merely nego-
tiating a union security clause that uses the statutory language contained in section 8(a) (3)
but does not explain and therefore inform workers of the Supreme Court's decision in
Beck); Ferriso v. NLRB, 125 F.3d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that where a union collects a
compulsory agency fee, it is required to provide nonmembers with an independent audit);
Abrams v. Communications Workers of Am., 59 F.3d 1373, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding
that union breached its obligations as it defined core expenditures too broadly and failed to
inform nonmembers that they had the right to object). As yet, a Supreme Court and/or
federal legislative remedy for these problem remains elusive. See Knollenberg, supra note
54, at 353-68.
106. See Hunter, supra note 52, at 6 (arguing that the NLRB has approached its en-
forcement duty timidly-it took more than seven years from the Beck case for it to issue its
first case explaining its policy).
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107abide by the customs of segregation, threats and other forms of
coercion'0 s impede a potential dues objector's ability to exit from
union membership and vindicate his Beck rights. Third, the federal
courts, blinded by their simplistic concern for free riders, invoke
free riding postulates incompletely and inappropriately and thus
fail to notice countervailing interests.'0 9 Despite these obstacles, the
Beck judgment, which sustains preexisting principles derived from
both the Railway Labor Act and public sector union cases," has
electrified an already exasperated group of union advocates. The
next subsection briefly examines this backlash.
D. The Response to Beck and Similar Decisions
Empowering Dues Objectors
Although a majority of both union members and the American
public agree that "a union should not be allowed to use members'
dues for political purposes,"''. Beck and similar decisions constrain-
ing the application of union dues have met with less than universal
acclaim. While one commentator asserts that "[b]oth the dues ob-
jector and the union majority champion legitimate interest[s],'
others argue that limiting the union majority's right to charge
compulsory dues imposes a constrained view of the normal and
proper role of a labor union and impairs activities aimed at
transforming the balance of power outside the immediate work-
place," 3 and that Beck constitutes a substantial burden on
107. E.g., McAdams, supra note 7, at 1041-42. This analogy is apt. Unions sought to ex-
clude blacks especially from craft and railway unions. For example, after racially motivated
strikes failed in the southern railroad industry, white trainmen engaged in terrorism, killing
several black trainmen. David E. Bernstein, Roots of the 'Underclass': The Decline of Laissez-Faire
Jurisprudence and The Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 85, 101 (1993).
108. See Knollenberg, supra note 54, at 364-65. "Employees who know their rights and
decide to take on the union establishment find the process... marked by threats of life,
family, intimidation, insults and coercion." Id. at 364.
109. See discussion infra Part IV.F.
110. See generally Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (discussing collec-
tive bargaining in the public sector); International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740 (1961) (construing the Railway Labor Act).
111. Hunter, supra note 50, at 13 (citing a Wall StreetJournal/NBC News Poll).
112. Hartley, supra note 8, at 3.
113. See Friesen, supra note 44, at 639. But see, Knollenberg, supra note 54, at 347
(advocating the strengthening of Beck through legislation "empowering union members
and non-members to decide individually if their dues or fees can be used by the union for
political or other purposes not germane to collective bargaining.").
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collective bargaining.'1 4 Still others resist respect for minority
workers' rights because such deference would not only weaken the
union but would also weaken the interests of working people gen-
erally.1 5 Others contend that union independence from any state
controls is (1) indispensable if unions are to democratize the work
place by providing a meaningful voice in the decisions that affect
workers; (2) necessary to avoid government regulation of wages;
(3) dictated by the aspiration to make real the previously illusory
concept of individual liberty by aggregating power to confront
other social and economic aggregations within society; and (4) not
oppressive to the individual despite obligatory financial support of
matters of general interest to union members because "taxation
for the common good and majority rule are accepted principles of
democracy and common practice in associations."
1 6
For some commentators, dues objector cases, if not the objec-
tors themselves, are an integral element of a general post-World
War II social and political movement to expunge politics, particu-
larly left-wing politics, from organized labor while simultaneously
encouraging antiunion employers and dissident members to attack
the financial base of unions at its foundation.1 7 Moreover, gov-
ernment regulation of competing interests in the political process
(allowing dues objectors to escape ideological expenses) cannot be
seen as neutral'1 8 unless one also agrees that it is possible to hinder
"the mouse without increasing the power of the cat.""1 Union de-
fenders contend that Beck must be reversed to facilitate the survival
of unionization. 120
Accordingly, for many observers, mandatory financial contribu-
tions in support of majoritarian union political expressions must
not only be permitted, they must also be compelled. 21 Suppression
of the minority to benefit the majority is the price dissident work-
ers must pay to facilitate the transformation of the workplace and
society. 22 This conclusion raises urgent questions concerning the
114. Lisa Rhode, Case Note, Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641
(1988), 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1567, 1594 (1989).
115. Kenneth Cloke, Mandatory Political Contributions and Union Democracy, 4 INDUS. REL.
LJ. 527, 528 (1981), cited in Hartley, supra note 8, at 5 n. 14.
116. Hartley, supra note 8, at 4 n.12.
117. Id. at 5 n.14 (citing Cloke, supra note 115, at 539, 563-64).
118. Friesen, supra note 44, at 639-40.
119. Cloke, supra note 115, at 567.
120. Friesen, supra note 44, at 645-46.
121. See e.g., id. at 645 (suggesting that there is a need for a statutory amendment that
compels the funding of union organizing expenses through union dues). See generally Cloke,
supra note 115.
122. Given the distinct possibility that a majority of union workers oppose the use of
their dues for political purposes, see Knollenberg, supra note 54, at 348-50, it is possible to
Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues? 469
legitimacy of union solidarity from a postmodern view, which the
next section attempts to answer.
III. A POSTMODERN VIEW IN THE MIRROR
OF SOLIDARITY
Historically, the workplace has been considered a place of con-
flict centered in the struggle between employers and workers.
23
Workers were generally seen as bound together in a transcendent
common interest, and whatever differences existed between and
among workers became diaphanous when framed against the
dominant friction between the interests of workers and manage-
ment. Indeed, the Wagner Act arguably transforms the operative
unit of labor from the individual to the collective, and unions have
demanded that the individual sacrifice her particular interest to
the "greater good" as the price of participation.
1 4
Today, however, the diversity of worker viewpoints is recognized
and the legitimacy of the sacrifice of particular interests or particu-
larized identities to the communal good remains under review.
2 5
This is consistent with the notion that we now live in an age which




(including group categories), and the omnipresence of knowl-
edge 127 (including knowledge about what workers want). Hence,
the universality of worker interest, and union solidarity are placed
in issue by voices calling for separation, separateness, and frag-
mentation.2  Unions cannot be seen as merely neutral actors.
Indifference and hostility from unions toward the diversity of
argue that both the majority and the minority must be suppressed by hierarchical and
dominant union leadership allied to political or ideological interest.
123. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1339.
124. Id. at 1342; see also Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Feminist Deconstruc-
tion, 33 B.C. L.REv. 481, 501 (1992).
125. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1342-43.
126. Michel Foucault, for example, gave precedence to the specific and special above
the general and universal and denied the universality of categories. STANLEY J. GRENZ, A
PRIMER ON POSTMODERNISM 127 (1996).
127. For example, knowledge in the sense that it connotes true beliefs considered as
useful nonrepresentational mental states as distinguished from accurate (and therefore use-
ful) representations of reality which actually correspond to reality is seen as a difference
which makes no difference in practice to pragmatic postmodernists. See RICHARD RORTY,
TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 20 (1998) [hereinafter, RORTY, TRUTH AND
PROGRESS]. Contra DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 27 (1997) (noting that "since the Enlightenment,
knowledge has been thought of as universally accessible and objective.").
128. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1340.
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worker interests have accelerated the fragmentation of worker in-
terests where such interests and identities differ from traditional
union constituencies.
1 29
Thus, proponents of the view that the vitality of the union
movement must be reclaimed through union dues should be
obliged to confront this question: To what degree can workers
with diverse identities in a pluralistic world be required to suppress
their identities in pursuit of the collective goals of majoritarian in-
stitutions? This question is the challenge that postmodernism
poses to all institutions wedded to collective power.
A. Postmodern Views
While some may conclude that all of the demands for recogni-
tion by particular groups, subgroups or individuals are dubious,
"[t]his conclusion is surely too hasty."130 On the other hand, for
instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his followers in satisfying the
perceived and perhaps universal3 1 need for public recognition,
attempted to convert the concept of human equality into iden-
tity.12 The Rousseauean politics of recognition, as one observer
notes, "is simultaneously suspicious of all social differentiation and
receptive to the homogenizing-indeed even totalitarian-
tendencies of a politics of the common good, where the common
good reflects the universal identity of all citizens."3 3 Some unions
and union leaders devoted to the idea of the "universal worker"
have replicated this commitment to "collective rights" and the
"common good."3 4
All attempts to achieve the collective good run the risk of sub-
merging the identity of subgroups and individuals to the service of
others. It is the challenge of the postmodernist emphasis on the
politics of difference, to recognize the unique identity of a particular
individual or group as distinct from project, with its everyone else.' 35
129. See supra note 57.
130. Amy Gutmann, Introduction to MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION 3, 4 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) [hereinafter MULTICULTURALISM].
131. Postmodernists generally do not believe in "universal" explanations. See RORTY,
TRUTH AND PROGRESS, supra note 127, at 19-42; David Brooks, Class Politics Versus Identity
Politics, 125 PUB. INT. 116, 118 (1996) (reviewing MICHAEL TOMASKY, LEFT FOR DEAD
(1996)).
132. See Gutmann, supra note 130, at 6.
133. Id. (citing Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM, Supra
note 130, at 38).
134. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1339-50.
135. See Taylor, supra note 133, at 38.
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While one can debate whether the recognition of uniqueness
should be optional or mandatory, or contest the relevance ofpostoden " -- 136
postmodern insights, it is nonetheless possible to maintain that
those who seek the possibility of recognition will find both their
identity and their particular interest eviscerated by what has been
called the "greater totalizing goals of the working class." 137 This
perception of subordination has been substantially enhanced by
the understanding that unions have often furthered the interest of
their traditional constituents at the expense of women and minori-
ties. 
3 8
When a union leader or the union majority conceptualizes a
particular purpose which mandatory union dues must promote, it
is difficult to conclude that such a purpose is derived or even de-
rivable from some transcendental standpoint or ontological
perspective. 3 9 If the politics of recognition demands that we live
consistently with the ideal of being true to oneself, it is only a
modest step to establish the politics of identity with its focus on the
politics of difference. This difference, in its individual or collective
senses must confront the real risk of being ignored, glossed over,
and ultimately assimilated into a dominant or majority identity. 40
136. See generally FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127 (arguing that postmodernism dis-
torts democratic discourse and is perhaps irrational).
137. This tendency toward disaggregation among labor unionists is not limited to the
United States. See Morten Madsen, Trade Union Democracy and Individualisation: The Cases of
Denmark and Sweden, 27 INDUS. REL.J.: EUR.J. ANALYSIS, POL. & PRAC. 115, 116 (1996).
138. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1348; see also Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions:
Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1157 (1991) (noting
that many feminists distrust male-dominated unions, which remain insensitive to many of
the concerns of women who play a minor role within unions); Karl Klare, The Quest for In-
dustrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights
Law, 61 OR. L. REv. 157, 162-64 (1982) (conceding the less-than-salutary history of unions
regarding racism).
139. See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 231 (2d ed. 1999) (stating
that postmoderns reject the notion of a foundational or transcendent source for truth or
justification while concurrently rejecting the notion of determinate unique meaning for
statements); RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS, supra note 127, at 11-13. On the other hand,
some form of consensus might be achievable through intersubjective agreement attainable
through free and open discussion of all available hypotheses and policies. See id. at 7.
140. See Hutchison, From Bujumbura to Mogadishu, supra note 7, at 142-44; Taylor, supra
note 133, at 25-38. Whether the demand for recognition by groups or individuals from
differing groups can be squared with "liberalism" as distinct from some version of the post-
modernist project is beyond the scope of this enterprise. Suffice it to say that one observer
posits at least two kinds of commitments to liberalism: (1) that which is incompatible with a
commitment to the flourishing of distinct cultures, religions, or collective goals beyond the
personal freedom and physical security, welfare and safety of its citizens; and (2) that which
allows for a state committed to the survival and flourishing of a particular nation, culture or
religion as long as the basic rights of citizens who have different commitments or no such
commitments are protected. See Michael Walzer, Comment, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra
note 130, at 99.
SUMMER 2000]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
For postmoderns, such assimilation is the principal sin "against
the ideal of authenticity." 41 In labor unions the sin has taken two
forms: (1) the subordination of the interests of individuals and
minority groups to majoritarian ideals and collective goods;14 ' and
(2) the assumption that the preferences of the majority and that of
individuals and the members of subgroups are congruent.43 As
Richard Rorty describes Nietzsche: "To fail as a poet-and thus...
to fail as a human being-is to accept somebody else's description
of oneself, to execute a previously prepared program .... "'44
Accordingly, to accept homogenized collective goals grounded in
the idea of the universal worker is to fail as a human.
B. Postmodernism and Group Cooperation Theory
In a postmodern, pluralistic world, group cooperation poses
both theoretical and operational problems, because humans are
potentially "egoistic, rational, utility maximizer[s] . The activities
of the group are advanced by appeals to group interests, group
loyalty, and group identity.'" While "some ... groups... serve the
individual's interest by minimizing the transaction costs she incurs
while acting to satisfy her preference for whatever interest or func-
tion the group facilitates,"' 147 attempts to reclaim the union
movement through union dues must confront the possibility that
preferences, and hence group identity and group loyalty, have be-
come and should become fragmented by the postmodern project.
If labor unions, conceived of as interest groups and as mini-
legislatures, seek to maximize the social welfare of their members,
they must confront the necessity of aggregating individual prefer-
ences in pursuit of a collective goal just as surely as the acquisition
141. Taylor, supra note 133, at 38. This notion of identity can find linkages with
.contemporary individualism [which] is dominated by ideas such as free choice in all as-
pects of life, the right to develop oneself, and to build one's own life uniquely, through free
and open selection of styles of living." Margalioth, supra note 30, at 48.
142. Such as fighting for "class-based justice."
143. Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and the United Front
Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1542, 1542-44 (1999).
144. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, & SOLIDARITY 28 (1989) [hereinafter
RORTY, CONTINGENCY]. Freedom for the individual can be conceived as the experience of
emancipation from oppression by nature as well as by other human beings. See KEITH AN-
SELL-PEARSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO NIETZSCHE AS POLITICAL THINKER 64 (1994).
145. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 2. As used here, utility maximization is not limited to
merely direct pecuniary goals.
146. See McAdams, supra note 7, at 1007.
147. Id.
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of collective goals provides benefits which may be distributed
evenly or unevenly within the group. Furthermore, to the extent
that the attainment of such goals provides external benefits and
generates external net cost to those outside the union, members of
identifiable subgroups (within and outside of the union) will likely
find that attainment of the union goal may not be in their sub-
group's interest. In other words, there is a conflict between the
assumed common identity of the union and various collective
identities, which demand recognition, as well as between any indi-
vidual identities, which seek recognition.
14
For example,
a black nationalist might state her case this way: "African-
American identity is shaped by African-American society, cul-
ture, and religion. It is dialogue with these black others that
shapes the black self; it is from black contexts that the con-
cepts through which African-Americans shape themselves are
derived. [Accordingly,] "white society, the white culture,
against which an African-American nationalism of the coun-
terconventional kind poses itself, is therefore not part of what
shapes the collective dimension of the individual identities of
black people in the United States."
149
If this accurately states one view of black nationalism, then unions
dominated by white men should not be able to dictate the broad
political goals and preferences of African-American dues payers.150
Similarly, a postmodern expressive individualist might state her
case this way: her life is successful and triumphant insofar as she
escapes from inherited and imposed descriptions of her existence
and finds new descriptions.""
This is the difference between the will to truth and the will to
self-overcoming. It is the difference between thinking of re-
demption as a making contact with something larger and
more enduring than oneself and [thinking of] redemption as
148. See K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and So-
cial Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 130, at 151.
149. Id. at 154-55.
150. One observer states that the politics of group assertion is grounded in the basic
principle that members of oppressed groups need separate organizations that especially
exclude those from more privileged groups. See IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS
OF DIFFERENCE 167 (1990).
151. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 144, at 29.
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Nietzsche describes it: "recreating all 'it was' into a 'thus I
willed it.' ,,52
As Rorty illumines, the post-modern world has been captured by a
de-universalized moral sense where the moral consciousness is
seen as historically conditioned-a product of time and chance as
well as political or aesthetic consciousness. 1 3 If true, it is hard to
understand why unions should have the universal right to speak on
this individual's behalf as a class-based force for societal solidarity
and social change."'
Yet, there is widespread support for the belief that "[p] eople can
best obtain the ends they desire in some cases by engaging in co-
operative behavior and in others by acting independently.'5 One
cooperative approach is to join a union; independent action might
involve threatening to quit. 1 6 Presumably, successful cooperation
can be more beneficial than independent action because coopera-
tion allows people to pool resources and divide tasks."5
Nevertheless, cooperation involves costs, which the independent
actor does not incur. '5" "[A]n actor will choose cooperation over
independent action only if the increased value of the benefits-
that is, the 'surplus' resulting from cooperation-exceeds the cost
of cooperation."15 9
The point of departure for these claims is the presumed validity
of what Eric Posner calls a "simplified model of group coopera-
tion. The salient features of the model include the concepts of
"solidarity," "group," and "category." "'Solidarity' denotes the abil-
ity of people to cooperate in the absence of legal sanctions."' 6' The
term "group" refers to a collection of people who choose to cooper-
ate-for example, the members of a union. 62 Lastly, "category"
means a collection of people who happen to share some attribute,
152. Id.
153. See id. at 30.
154. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 199-202 (asserting that unions have both the power
and the right to speak on behalf of the entire workforce as a class-based force for societal
solidarity and social change). To be fair, even postmoderns of the pragmatic variety speak at
times of human solidarity as "our recognition of one another's... humanity." RORTY, CON-
TINGENCY, supra note 144, at 189.




159. Id. Cooperation surplus in this context refers to the actor's share of the joint sur-
plus created in a two person model less her share of the cost of cooperation. Id.
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such as employment, but who do not necessarily cooperate with
each other. 16 When the payoffs to cooperation exceed the payoffs
to acting independently, a necessary but insufficient condition for
cooperation is met. 64 All this appears rather uncontroversial, but
several caveats are warranted.
While Posner states that this simplified model applies to labor
unions, this analysis does not fully apply to all unions organized
pursuant to the NLRA. First, in most states, such organizations can
impose legal sanctions, which lead to the termination of a worker's
employment,6 5 when the worker fails to "cooperate" by paying
dues.'6 Sanctions present a challenge to Posner's framework by
introducing an element of coercion that is inconsistent with his
model of voluntary collaboration.' 67 Will a dues payer continue to
pay dues because she is obliged in the same sense one pays a robber
who points a gun at one's head, or because she acts out of a sense
of obligation believing that one ought to do so premised on some
intrinsic moral duty based on mutual benefit?'
6
Second, Posner's notion of "category" seemingly overlooks the
fact that both individuals and subgroups of employees in a post-
modern world have enormous differences, which could more than
offset the value of the shared attribute (employment). It is ques-
tionable whether such a modest level of sharing is sufficiently
meaningful to provide a basis for instrumental commonality be-
tween workers.
163. Id.
164. Where both actors share a joint surplus over independent action that will not en-
sure cooperation. The logic of the prisoner's dilemma demonstrates that each actor finds it
rational to cheat-that is, to attempt to convince her fellow actor that she will in fact coop-
erate but then to defect. See id. at 138.
165. While the Taft-Hartley act allows individual states to make union shops illegal,
most states have declined this option. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act
§ 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158. Accordingly, unions in most states can seek the termination of
nondues paying workers if the union is the exclusive bargaining representative. Labor Man-
agement Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158.
166. On the other hand, one onlooker asserts that "[o]nly nonmembers are associated
with the union through ... union security." Hartley, supra note 8, at 10 n.34. While such a
claim has some relevance, the essential point is that unions have at their disposal a powerful
enforcement mechanism backed by the power of government, which contains a coercive
element. Concededly, certain religious objectors can escape direct payments to the union
by making equal payments to a charitable organization.
167. This problem resembles H.L.A. Hart's distinction between being obliged to act
and acting out of sense of obligation. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 80-82 (1972).
For an accessible introduction to Hart's concepts, see Bix, supra note 139, at 33-36.
168. HART, supra note 167, at 82; see Sylvester Petro, Civil Liberty, Syndicalism, and the
NLRA, 5 U. TOL. L. Rv. 447, 450-51 (arguing that only ignorance or duplicity accounts for
the common practice of referring to the NLRA as establishing a regime of "free collective
bargaining"). But see Brudney, supra note 4, at 1565 (asserting that workers in a collective
bargaining setting "gave up" their freedom to contract on an individual basis).
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Additionally, individuals can be members of several groups si-
multaneously. It is possible that some individuals are
predominately affective-oriented, that is, they have principle con-
cern for members of the same affective-oriented group, be it
gender, race or ethnicity. If true, the value of non-affective-
oriented shared attributes such as employment would seem to be
reduced. In addition, the Posner model seems to assume, unlike
the postmodern project, that all cooperation produces benefits as
people pool their resources and their lives. 9 Postmodernism di-
minishes the viability of the conclusion that cooperation, as
opposed to independent action, is beneficial insofar as it demon-
strates that there may be no conclusive intersection between the
union's goals and the goals of various collective and individual
identities.
On the other hand, the postmodern project is congruent with the
cooperation model insofar as it recognizes and affirms the construc-
tion of identity through one's membership in various racial, gender,
religious, or sexual categories. Thus, ethnic homogeneity has been
shown to reduce transaction costs and thereby enhance group
solidarity.1 7 0 However, to the extent that individuals are fragmented
into racial, gender, and class categories, the benefits of broad
(cross-class, cross-racial) solidarity decline as the benefits of affec-
tive-group affiliation rise. Thus, the benefits of union solidarity will
decline as the calculus of cooperation versus independence
changes in favor of independence. 7' This conclusion questions the
169. Posner suggests that groups engage in the pooling of resources and the division of
tasks. Posner, supra note 10, at 137. The postmodern project argues that people cannot
necessarily be pooled, homogenized, and/or universalized. The postmoderD desire for
uniqueness may require a fairly high degree of separation. Pooling of resources (immaterial
or material) may diminish uniqueness. For instance, ethnic solidarity may require that we
only engage in dialogue with those who share our hue, and implies both instrumental and
substantive or normative benefits for the recognition of difference. If true, some form of
cooperation and pooling eviscerates our unique identity. See Hutchison, From Bujumbura to
Mogadishu, supra note 7, at 160-61.
170. SeeJanet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middlemen Group: An Insti-
tutionalAlternative to Contract Law, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 359-61 (1981).
171. Additionally, it is suggested that the calculus of cooperation and independence
may change after an individual joins a cooperative venture. Depending on the incentives
available, "the actor will (1) cooperate, (2) free ride (in other words defect), or (3) revert to
independent action." Posner, supra note 10, at 137. In this view, "[t]he payoff from coopera-
tion equals the actor's share of the cooperative surplus less the actor's cooperation cost.
The payoff from defection equals the share of the cooperative surplus less the expected cost
associated with detection and sanction ... [while t]he payoff from independent action in-
cludes neither a share of the cooperative surplus nor any cost of cooperation." Id. at 137-
38.
It is not altogether clear how the model handles or should handle the possibility that an
ideological objector to union dues could resign and pay only core union dues. Could this
case be plausibly characterized as (1) less than full cooperation, (2) defection/free riding,
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legitimacy of the concept of the universal worker and the intrinsic
worth of union solidarity as well as the contested idea of free rid-
ing which fuels the union dues debate.
IV. FREE RIDING, FORCED RIDING: FROM BECK
TO PUBLIC CHOICE
A. Conceiving the Free Rider: A Public Choice View
Proponents of the collective good utilize the government, vol-
untary collaboration, and involuntary action in securing a just and
equitable distribution of resources and collective goods. 72 Where
the central government provides collective goods and services,
such collective goods are theoretically nonexcludable. 73 If the
goods in question are pure public goods, they would be character-
ized as non-rival in consumption and nonexcludable in supply.
74
Significantly, "[t]here are increasingly few examples remaining of
pure public good[s] otherwise defined as a public externality.',
75
or (3) a reversion to completely independent action? This issue will be discussed but not
necessarily solved in the next section.
172. P. A. McNuTr, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE 178 (1996). To be sure, some
groups expend vast amount of resources to obtain rent-seeking legislation which primarily
benefits its members or most of its members. See Macey, supra note 70, at 377. Labor union
rent-seekers for instance, might attempt to obtain legally mandated barriers to entry such as
licensing requirements. See id. at 377 n.12.
173. McNu-rr, supra note 172, at 178.
174. Id. at 181.
There are two salient properties pertaining to the provision of collective goods,
namely, non-excludability in supply and nonrivalry in consumption. The latter im-
plies that... the consumption by one citizen of the collective good will not affect the
consumption level of any other citizen. Radio broadcasts, clean air or defence spring
to mind as examples of a non-rivalrous collective good. Nonexcludability is the hall-
mark of a political system where the central government funding emanates directly
from citizen taxation [or regulation).
Id. at 178-79.
Conceptually, there is a difference between club and interest group provision of collec-
tive goods. "Whereas a club provision refers to an excludable goods provision, an interest
group provision may refer to the possibility of a non-excludable goods provision .... How
[this affects the] theory of public goods provision ultimately depends on intra-interest
group economies of organisation." Id. at 180. Accordingly, if unions are conceived of as a
club, union provision may refer to an excludable good, meaning that it is only available to
dues paying members.
175. Id. at 181.
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The production of public goods and externalities' 76 creates market
imperfections by furnishing benefits and imposing costs on indi-
viduals who are not necessarily members of the particular interest
group or groups, which worked to attain the good. Some interest
groups, such as labor unions, industrial trade groups, and farmer
associations, seek to further the narrow objectives of their mem-
bers by delivering club goods, such as higher wages for members.
77
This concentrated focus may allow these interest groups to insist
on the provision of goods largely for the benefit of members while
excluding nonmembers (or perhaps nondues payers) . Other
groups, such as peace or environmental groups, seek to influence
public policy or opinion broadly by providing nonexcludable
benefits to society as a whole or to nonmembers of their group.
179
Groups, which organize initially to provide club goods, such as la-
bor unions, will also often seek to influence the distribution and
kinds of nonexcludable public goods available to their members.""'
While commonality may be presumed, groups, subgroups and
individuals may nonetheless have disparate interests. Such interests
may be narrowly or broadly focused. For instance, the various sub-
groups or the individuals within the association may share a
common organizational goal such as the requirement that only
licensed plumbers (union plumbers) be allowed to work in federal
buildings. This provides excludable benefits to union plumbers.
On the other hand, some members of the union or the leadership
of the group might seek to further nonexcludable public goods
such as enhanced social justice. Such efforts extend group goals
beyond pecuniary concerns. If a group has one common and nar-
rowly prescribed interest (e.g. increased wages), it is possible for
those in positions of power to capture the common interest in in-
creased wages to further a particular and nonexcludable collective
good. The resulting benefits and costs will not necessarily be
shared equally, however. This is especially true where the benefits
primarily accrue to nonmembers and the costs accrue to members.
It is possible that many union dues payers share with union leader-
ship the common goal of attaining any particular public good or
club good.
176. See id. at 178.
177. See MUELLER, supra note 1, at 308. Another example of a collective club good
might be the statutory imposition of a licensing requirement by a union which already con-
trols the supply of licensed plumbers or pipe fitters.
178. See supra note 174.
179. See id.
180. SeeJERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE
TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 15 (1997). "Private groups [often] prefer to have social resources
shifted from the general public to their members." Id.
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Still, in a postmodern world, many are not all. Must those indi-
vidual dues payers (either of an expressive individualist or a black
nationalist variety) who oppose the group's attempt to attain a
given public or collective good be required to resign from mem-
bership and lose the utility of the opportunity to influence union
affairs and yet still be compelled to provide financial support be-
cause of an oppressive concern for the free rider? More succinctly,
are all dissenting employees, whether they resign or not, whether
they receive benefits or not, subject to the logic of free riding?
B. Free Riding, Union Dues: A Public Choice View
While unions were largely conceived in the 1930s and 1940s as
economic agents attempting to maximize worker gains in exclud-
able collective goods, such as higher wages, better working
conditions, and fewer hours, some unions today conceive their
goals in broader terms."1 The primary goal of the Taft-Hartley Act
in eliminating closed shops was to eviscerate free riding by workers
who receive the benefits of improved wages, working conditions,
and hours.8 2 From a group cooperation theory perspective, if the
collective good is conceived of as better wages for members of the
group, because of the tendency of some workers to defect, it might
be undersupplied15 3 Accordingly, and consistent with public
choice theory, trade unions insist on, and legislatures enact,
"separate and 'selective' incentive(s)"184 to curb free-riding. Trade un-
ions have fought to have employers deduct dues from union
members' wages, have sought to maintain closed shops and, where
that has not been possible, have endeavored to put in place union
security agreements complete with check-off provisions.8 5
Where they have succeeded in forcing employers to abide by
these rules, as in many states in the United States and in the
181. See, e.g., Werntz, supra note 44, at 166 (noting that unions assert that even core col-
lective bargaining activities go beyond the bargaining table and include "organizing,
lobbying, and participation in social, charitable and political events vital to bolstering the
Union's bargaining clout") (footnote omitted).
182. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 747-50 (1988). "By
1947 Congress was equally concerned, however, that without such agreements, many em-
ployees would reap the benefits that unions negotiated on their behalf without in any way
contributing to the financial support of these efforts .... [resulting in the] man who does
not pay dues rid[ing] along freely." Id. at 748 (citations omitted).
183. Posner, supra note 10, at 143.
184. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 308.
185. Id. at 309.
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United Kingdom, union membership has been relatively
high and union workers have earned higher wages. In
France, where these selective incentives encouraging union
participation are absent, union membership is much lower
and largely ineffective.
8 6
Arguably "the best evidence that such selective incentives are
needed to avoid free-riding behavior is the importance union
leaders place on getting legislation and/or contractual stipulations
requiring closed shop contracts, the collection of union dues, and
the like.'0 7 Apparently, worker solidarity real or presumed will not
suffice."'
C. Applying Free Rider Analysis to Union
Mandated Collective Goods
The free rider concern is premised upon the assumed congru-
ence between the economic interests of the worker and the
union. Is9 This conclusion is dubious. As one commentator notes,
"it is plainly untrue that all workers share equally"'90 in the eco-
nomic gains attributable to union activity at every stage of both the
negotiating and grievance processing-the union must engage in
discriminations among workers and categories of workers.' 9' Con-
sequently, "[s]ome workers benefit, but only at the expense of
others."192 Whether assumed economic congruence can be fully
disproved is beyond the scope of this Article. The absence or exis-
tence of economic congruence between the union and subgroups
and individuals will be of consequence; however, the primary con-
cern of this Article is the extent of congruence between the
ideological interests of individuals and minority dissidents on one
hand, and of the union leadership on the other. A divergence in
preferences between the individual and the union will enhance the
186. Id. (footnote omitted).
187. Id.
188. See id
189. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975)
(reasoning that collective strength requires the subordination of the strengths of individuals
and groups to the interest of the majority); see also McUsic & Selmi, supra note 3, at 1344
n.17.
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benefits of independent action by reducing the benefits and the
shared surplus derived from cooperative action.
Because individuals may misrepresent their preferences for the
collective good in an attempt to free ride, underprovision of the
collective good may result. 93 Accordingly, where an individual un-
ion member shares the same goal of attaining a particular public
or collective good with the union, union leaders can legitimately
claim that the collective interest requires that all who benefit from
goods supplied through union effort must be required to pay un-
ion dues.
On the other hand, where the dues payer does not receive the
benefits of the particular public or collective good because she dis-
approves of the goal selected on her behalf by the union majority,
she is not a free rider. The cooperation surplus available to her has
declined while the benefits of independent action have increased.
In fact, if she is compelled to pay dues in support of a particular
and detestable ideological objective, then she is a forced rider. A
forced rider is an individual who is required to consume a public
good whether she likes it or not T9 or receives benefits or not. Thus,
absent relocation constraints, a worker forced to contribute dues
to fund the attainment of a public good could simply leave herjob.
For analytical purposes, an individual who is compelled to pay
dues should not be compelled to give up her job where she objects
to the allocation of such payments to promote public goods or col-
lective goods from which she secures no benefit. To conclude
otherwise is inconsistent with an individual's autonomy90 and is
hence prima facie illegitimate. Similar analysis with respect to
members of identifiable subgroups of the union would lead to a
comparable conclusion.
In some circumstances there may be no conflict within the or-
ganization about the attainment of collective goods. For instance
public choice and group cooperation scholars agree that smaller
193. McNuTr, supra note 172, at 186.
194. Id. at 189. This analysis is derived from McNutt's economic analysis of clubs, which
are analogous to unions so long as one understands that unions likely have more power as
they benefit from more legal sanctions than clubs generally. For example, labor unions are
the beneficiary of statutory monopoly power that allows them to wield market power and to
influence wages. See MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER 3 (1987).
195. The absence of a rule that precludes the employee's termination would fail to deal
with an individual's dignity and autonomy interest in retaining a particular job. For an ex-
panded discussion of dignity and autonomy concerns in the context of employment
termination generally, see HUGH COLLINS, JUSTICE IN DISMISSAL 16-21 (1992); Epstein,
supra note 6, at 953-55; see alSoJOHN GRAY, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET INSTITU-
TIONS 26 (1992) (arguing that autonomy is an essential element of the good life for people
situated in our historical context).
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groups are more likely to solve their collective action problems co-
operatively. 6 On the other hand, the available evidence indicates
sharp disagreement between the opinions of union leadership and
those of workers in the United States.
97
Where the union's conception of the appropriate collective goal
differs from that of an objector, who is nonetheless compelled to
pay dues in full, the beneficiaries of union dues (the majority of
union workers, union leaders, or nonexcludable members of the
public) realize the benefits of the public or collective goal without
incurring the whole cost. Income is redistributed and welfare is
reallocated by a coercive transfer from dissenters to subsidize the
preferences and welfare of others. 98 Where objectors refuse to pay
dues in service of incompatible preferences, they cannot be char-
acterized as free riders. Moreover, where the objecting individual
(or subgroup of workers) is obliged to resign from the union as a
predicate to avoiding payment of dues for objectionable causes,
the union majority effectively excludes her,' 99 as she can no longer
200hold the union leadership accountable: Consequently, her core
dues will probably supply a lesser utility. Hence, one cannot even
assume that the ideological dissenter receives the full value of her
core dues.
196. See McNuTr, supra note 172, at 4; see also Posner, supra note 10, at 140-41
(describing the importance of membership monitoring systems that occur in small groups
in order to ensure solidarity and survival).
197. Knollenberg, supra note 54, at 360 (observing that while unions overwhelmingly
fund Democrat party candidates and causes, more than thirty percent of the union work-
force are Republican and another ten percent support third party candidates). It is possible,
if not likely, that even those numbers overstate private sector union member support of the
Democrat party as such figures include both public and private sector members. Public
sector union members are much more likely to vote for the Democrats. I am indebted to
Leo Troy for this insight. See also Stephen J. Hadley et al., Note, Union Elections and the
LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE LJ. 409, 417-21 (1972) (describing that
union leaders, who have been out of the shop for many years, and who have a monopoly
hold on both their positions and the streaming of communication within the union, be-
come closer to being employers themselves, falling out of touch with the working union
membership).
198. To take one example, despite the political diversity among union members, union
dues were used to pay part of the cost of the Ohio Democratic Party's new state headquar-
ters. See Union Dues Buys Ohio Democrats New Headquarters, POL. MONEY MONITOR, Feb. 27,
1998, at 2, available at http://www.nationalcenter.org/PMMl0.html (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
199. Such exclusion is consistent with the entire exclusionary history of labor unions.
See Bernstein, supra note 107, at 85; Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of
Minimum Wage Regimes, supra note 43, at 118-26.
200. The union must, of course, conform to its duty of fair representation despite her
resignation.
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D. A Model of Free and Forced Riding
A simple hypothetical model"°1 may be helpful in understanding
unions as comprising an amalgamation of distinct interest groups
and individuals with disparate interests and dissimilar preferences
and utility valuations. This model demonstrates the possibility of
more kinds of free and forced riding than either the courts or
Congress have imagined.
UNION GOALS
DIRECT AND NON- EXPAND LEGISLATION EXPANDING
EXCLUDABLE EXCLUDABLE THE SPECIFIC TO MEMBERSHIP
ECONOMIC IDEOLOGICAL POLITICAL THE GENERALLY








A-Classic Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree
free rider
B-Partial Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
free rider
C-Post- Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree
modern forced
rider








201. This formulation assumes that the Beck decision and its progeny are a proper ini-
tial starting point.
202. Direct and excludable economic benefits would include wages, salaries, working
hours, and other objectives commonly associated with collective bargaining.
203. Nonexcludable ideological goods could include, for instance, union advocacy to
improve childcare, decriminalize marijuana, and increase the minimum wage.
204. This category would include supporting political candidates, political parties, and
political causes which have a particular view of society and human life.
205. An example of an excludable club good might include advocacy of legislation re-
quiring that all pipe fitters on government projects be licensed and paid the prevailing wage
where the union operates an apprentice system leading to the licensing of pipe fitters.
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The above diagram scarcely hints at the diversity of viewpoints,
combinations and preferences available. In addition, several cave-
ats are warranted. First, there may be degrees of agreement or
disagreement between individuals, subgroups, the majority, and
union leadership. Second, even where individuals or subgroups
express disagreement, it is possible to postulate that such dissent-
ers might credibly receive the benefits of core/economic,
noncore/ideological, or other collective union policy and their
declared disagreement may simply mask preferences for the collec-
tive goal or collective good however described.
Despite the caveats, where individual dues payers and subgroups
of dues payers fail to obtain the benefits of the proposed
core/economic or noncore/ideological objective or an excludable
or nonexcludable good, it is illogical to assert that such individuals
and subgroups are free riding.20 First, the model assumes that
where an individual or subgroup is in agreement or disagreement
with her union that constitutes a statement of true preference.
Second, a limited number of examples of the collective goods as-
sociated with specific union goals are illustrated, where
appropriate, by footnotes.
1. Individual A-Classic Free Rider-Individual A is in full
agreement with all the collective aims of the union. The group co-
operation surplus outstrips the benefits of independence or
defection by a wide margin. Consistent with public choice theory,
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and the Taft-Hartley Act's leg-
islative history, Individual A could free ride with regard to all of
the collective goods offered by the union. Accordingly, she should
be compelled to pay her union dues in full.
2. Individual B-Partial Free Rider--On the other hand, Individ-
ual B, despite his agreement with the collective core/economic
goals, disagrees with all other stated objectives. The only advan-
tages he gains from cooperation, as opposed to independence, are
the economic benefits that membership provides him. He could
only be a free rider with respect to core economic goals. Given the
implications of Beck, however, he could be required to resign from
the union and to relinquish his union governance prerogatives as
the price of withholding his contribution to the union's noncore
or ideological objectives-and he still must brave the insults,
threats, and other informal enforcement mechanisms that act as
206. That is, unless one can plausibly argue that their failure to terminate their em-
ployment relationship constitutes conclusive evidence of receipt of the benefits of the
union policy.
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'207barriers to exiting the union. The opportunity to influence un-
ion decisions and the fear of intimidation might cause him to
undervalue his ideological and political interests in favor of tran-
quillity. If he declines to resign despite his distaste for the union's
noncore goals, this decision results in a net reduction in the
amount of free riding he could savor. Hence, he could only be a
partial or incomplete free rider.08
In addition, it can be argued that nonobjecting members, the
putative beneficiaries of the noncore goals, are themselves free
riders or at least partial free riders with regard to noncore ex-
penses to the detriment of noncore objectors such as Individual B.
Because Individual B does not receive any benefits from noncore
expenditures, those who actually receive the benefit of a particular
noncore goal underpay to the extent that Individual B declines to
resign and pays a fully allocated portion of union dues.
3. Individual C-Postmodern Forced Rider-Individual C disagrees
with the full menu of collective goods and receives no welfare
benefits from any of the union's collective goals. Because the
benefits of cooperation are less than the benefits of independence,
she cannot free ride on union efforts. On the contrary, despite the
Supreme Court's free rider presumption, °9 non-objecting union
members obtain a subsidized ride at Individual C's expense. Fur-
thermore, in light of the union security agreement entered into
by the union and her employer, her sole method of escaping this
imposed reduction in her welfare caused by any union dues is to
terminate her employment relationship. 0 If Individual C retains
207. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
208. In fact, it is possible to speculate that were he to decline to resign from member-
ship, and simultaneously fail to pay any dues whatsoever, then he would not be a free rider
despite claims made by the court in Beck. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735, 748-50 (1988). If (1) the positive utility derived from the excludable economic bene-
fits (that is, benefits which are only available to members of the union) on offer plus (2) the
positive utility (however determined) of retaining his union democracy rights with regard to
core union equals the disutility of his distaste for noncore union expenditure, then he is
plausibly not a free rider. Where true equality is achieved between the core benefits he
receives and the disutility associated with his distaste for the noncore expenditures he must
endure, then he should not be required to pay any dues. Thus, where the utility of inde-
pendence exceeds the utility of core dues cooperation, the cooperation surplus is negative,
and free riding is impossible.
209. Beck, 487 U.S. at 749 (concluding that union security agreements are designed to
eliminate free riders and assumes that all employees receive the benefits of union represen-
tation).
210. Earlier analysis grounded on autonomy considerations foreclosed this option. See
supra note 195 and accompanying text. However, if the assumed importance of autonomy is
eliminated, her willingness to resign will be a function of a variety of factors including the
availability of alternative employment, the quality and quantity of relocation restraints, the
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her job but resigns her membership to avoid paying noncore
dues, she would still be required to pay for core union represen-
tation because she is a presumed free rider, 211 despite the loss of
her union governance rights. If her democratic rights have utility,
her compelled resignation should serve to increase the amount of
forced riding she incurs by increasing the net disutility she receives
per dollar of core dues.
4. Subgroup R-Modified Classic Free Riders-Much, if not all of
the above analysis referring to Individual A, applies to Subgroup R.
This group would be subject to the logic of free riding for all un-
ion goals except nonexcludable ideological ones. The benefits of
these goals flow to members and nonmembers alike, but they are
not shared equally within the union. All members bear the costs,
regardless of whether they receive the benefit. Because union dis-
senters do not receive the benefits of ideological goals, they are
partial forced riders. Where they cannot elude ideological dues
payments, they subsidize the preferences of others; and over provi-
sion of union-sponsordd ideological goods are likely to occur, as
the putative beneficiaries do not pay the full costs of such goods.
perceived advantages she secures from her employment despite the union dues, and lastly,
the amount of dues demanded.
211. Recall, beneath the rhetoric of protection against free riding, see Beck, 487 U.S. at
748-49, that the Supreme Court assumes uncritically that she would be a free rider with
respect to core/economic goals. See id. The Court accepts that in the absence of a compul-
sory contribution scheme-i.e., a union security agreement-all workers could reap the
benefits of unionization without in any way contributing financial support to the union. Her
ability to free ride depends on whether the union provides her with actual economic bene-
fits greater than the cost of such benefits. Economic data suggest that unions provide some
economic benefits to average union workers who earn a wage premium versus nonunion
workers. See REYNOLDS, supra note 194, at 73 (citing studies suggesting that union wages
range from sixteen to thirty percentage points above the wages of similarly skilled nontnion
workers); see also RICHARD K. VEDDAR & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOY-
MENT AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 258 (1993). However, it must be
conceded that the union will not necessarily improve the wages and benefits of all mem-
bers. Thus, if one assumes that she has special abilities and operates within a fight labor
market, the presumed economic benefits of the union will not necessarily accrue to her.
Further, given the existence of intra-group conflict, the union will inevitably favor one indi-
vidual at the expense of another especially in the contest for promotions. It is doubtful that
the loser in such a contest will concede that the union acted in her interest. See, e.g., Benson
v. Communications Workers of Am., 866 F. Supp. 910, 914-15 (E.D. Va. 1994) (discussing
junior employee's claim against union and employer alleging that union breached its duty
of fair representation with regard to its opposition to his promotion); see also Petro, supra
note 168, at 511 (describing how unions successfully negotiate for higher pay resulting in
less demand for nonunion workers thus undermining the argument that all workers benefit
equally from the union).
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5. Subgroup S-Postmodern Forced Riders-- 12The above analysis of
Individual C applies equally to Subgroup S. Members of Subgroup
S would be both core and noncore forced riders as the benefits of
independence from union dues clearly exceeds the benefits of co-
operation. If they wish to exercise their right to object to
nonpecuniary expenditures, they must suppress their democratic
rights. Additionally, postmodern scholars have expressed concern
for members of marginalized groups.' 3 If Subgroup S is a margi-
nalized ethnic or gender category concerned about all category
constituents, whether union members or not, then in order to ex-
press their displeasure with the noncore goals of the union they
must become even more marginalized by losing union governance
rights, thus further reducing their already minimal influence. Sec-
ond, to the extent that there is an absence of congruence between
the union and members of Subgroup S with respect to both core
and noncore goals, a form of reverse income redistribution argua-
bly occurs. If members of Subgroup S continue to pay full dues,
they subsidize the preferences of others. Because Subgroup S is
probably already economically marginalized, the coerced transfer
of funds to achieve the collective goals of the union's leadership or
majority constitutes a regressive transfer payment.2 14 It can be ar-
gued that all forms of income redistribution are objectionable,2 5
and it is especially difficult to find any principled support for
transfers that diminish the income of the economically disadvan-
taged in favor of those who are better off.21 6 Thus, the transfer of
212. This identifiable postmodern subgroup could be, for instance, a predominately af-
fective-oriented group containing individuals whose self-worth is enhanced or diminished
by what happens to the group. See Dixon, supra note 65, at 178-79. Under this conception,
the self-worth of the group is diminished or enhanced by what happens to individual mem-
bers of this group. See Petro, supra note 168, at 511.
213. See Roy L. Brooks & MaryJo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-Liberal Civil
Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REv. 787, 803 (1994);John 0.
Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life
in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2207 (1992); Mary I. Coombs, Outsider
Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 686 (1992).
214. This can be imagined by assuming that a group of African-American workers are
required against their will to pay dues in support of advocacy for the minimum wage, which
would reduce the average income of African-Americans by increasing disproportionately
the level of African-American unemployment. See ARMEN A. ALcIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN,
EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION AND CONTROL 335 (3d ed.
1983) (stating that the groups most vulnerable to the adverse effects of minimum wages
include teenagers, blacks, women, and the aged); Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist
Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes, supra note 43, at 108-34.
215. See generally BERTRAND DEJOUVENEL, THE ETHICS OF REDISTRIBUTION (1952).
216. First, most economic rents generated in the United States accrue to labor. See
Harry G. Hutchison, Distributional Consequences, Policy Implications of Voluntary Export Re-
straints on Textiles and Apparel, Steel, and Automobiles, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 1757, 1769 n.4 (1992)
(citing Lawrence F. Katz & Lawrence H. Summers, Industry Rents: Evidence and Implications,
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income from the members of Subgroup S to benefit members of
the non-marginalized majority is unjustified. Nor are the mem-
bers of the majority the only beneficiaries of such regressive
transfers; if the collective good in question is nonexcludable,
then to the extent the beneficiaries of this transfer are relatively
better-off than members of Subgroup S, the dues payments which
facilitated the provision of the good are a regressive transfer.
Consistent with public choice theory, members of the majority
also underpay for the benefits of unionization. If members of Sub-
group S decline to resign from the union because they lack
sufficient information concerning their Beck rights, for instance,
then the majority is potentially subsidized with regard to both core
and noncore union expenditure. Moreover, if the members of
Subgroup S resign but are nonetheless forced to pay core dues, the
majority will be subsidized with regard to core dues.217 Underpay-
ment of dues by members of the majority constitutes a form of free
or partial free riding, while dues overpayments by members of
Subgroup S constitutes a form of forced riding given the coopera-
tion-independence calculus. 2 1 8 This possibility was overlooked by
the Supreme Court.
Lastly, it is likely that unions will inflate the amount of dues re-
quired to support core "benefits" or otherwise act to obstruct the
exercise of Beck rights.29 The Supreme Court has not provided
in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 209, 209-10 (1989))
[hereinafter Hutchison, Distributional Consequences]. Second, labor unions as a whole seem
to do well at the expense of minorities. See REYNOLDS, supra note 194, at 29; see also THOMAS
SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES 110 (1981) (noting that government-supported unions
were used to limit black employment); Hutchison, Through the Pruneyard Coherently, supra
note 35, at 35-36 (noting that unions redistribute income to their well-paid white members
at the expense of groups with lower incomes).
217. Additionally, members of the majority/leadership gain some hypothetical value
associated with their freedom from being held accountable to, or being associated with,
members of Subgroup S, since the subgroup most probably forfeits its governance rights.
218. In fact, such forced riding may be a form of rent-seeking.
219. In Abrams v. Communications Workers of America, 23 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51-54
(D.D.C. 1998), the court agreed that the Communications Workers union had overstated its
core expenses, which accordingly understates noncore expenses to the detriment of dissent-
ing dues payers. In addition, unions commonly fail to report so-called "in-kind"
expenditures despite statutory requirements that they must file financial reports with the
Federal Election Commission. Influencing Elections: Political Activity of Labor Unions: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means: Subcomm. on Oversight, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Leo Troy, Professor of Economics, Rutgers Univ.), available at
http://www.claremont.org/campfin/leotroy.cfm (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). Such "in-kind" expenditure can exceed direct financial expenditures.
See id. To the extent that Professor Troy's statement is true, and to the extent that the
proper allocation of dues into core and noncore categories is unreported or underre-
ported, this leads inevitably to an overstatement of core dues. For a discussion of the proper
allocation of funds between core and noncore expense, see Hartley, supra note 8, at 29-35.
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careful guidance in delineating which union activities should be
chargeable to dues objectors.2 Possible overstatements grounded
in "computational problems" understate both the level of free rid-
ing by union supporters and the amount of forced riding incurred
by dissenters. Free rider analysis by the Court and Congress fails to
account for the possibility.
E. Refining the Free Rider Model
If computational and allocational problems associated with re-
liably defining core and noncore dues can be resolved, the
amounts of free riding and forced riding that accrue to dues objec-
tors can be analyzed as follows:
Comprehensive Free Riding = KFR = f(EB + NCPB)-f
(EC + NCC).
Where KFR = Comprehensive Free Riding;
EB = f(economic benefits);
NCPB = f(noncore/nonpecuniary benefits);
EC = economic costs = f(core dues payment); 2 1
NCC = noncore costs = f(provision of noncore dues
payment by dues objectors + other nonpecuniary
cost 222 [e.g. the disutility of losing the right to par-
ticipate in union governance as well as the disutility
of barriers to exit]).
Put differently, a comprehensive Free Rider = KFR = f
(EFR + NCFR)
Where an Economic Free Rider = f(EFR) = f(EB - EC).
220. See Hartley, supra note 8, at 9. Further, a review of Supreme Court cases demon-
strates that the proper allocation between lawful, chargeable dues activities is articulated at
such a high degree of abstraction, it is doubtful that it can serve as a meaningful guide to
deciding future case. See id,
221. Notably core dues payment under this conception may or may not be equal to the
amount referred to as germane to collective bargaining. The "germane to collective bar-
gaining" test was repeatedly emphasized in Beck and has been applied in RLA contexts. See
Hartley, supra note 8, at 10.
222. If the individual is a member of a predominantly affective-oriented grouping and
also a union member/dues payer, then consistent with the perspective that what diminishes
the ethnic group, for example, diminishes the individual, her noncore costs should reflect
the disutility of being diminished by virtue of the loss in her welfare attributable to the re-
duction in the welfare of her kin. See Dixon, supra note 65, at 178-79. Conceptually,
nonpecuniary costs are analogous to what economists call "shadow prices." RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6 (1998).
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A Noncore Free Rider = f(NCFR) = f(NCPB -NCC).
If EC [economic costs] exceeds EB [ECONOMIC BENE-
FITS], then EFR [economic free rider calculus] is
negative and,
If NCC [noncore cost] exceeds NCPB
[noncore/nonpecuniary benefits], then NCFR
[noncore free rider calculus] is negative.
Thus, the comprehensive free rider calculus should look like this:
KFR = f(EFR + NCFR) with a full understanding that both EFR
and NCFR could be negative. This raises the distinct possibility
that KFR can be a negative. Where KFR is negative, comprehensive
free riding is absent and comprehensive forced riding is present.
This implies that the benefits or payoff to independence exceeds
the benefits of cooperation.
Where for example, a union champions such nonexcludable
goals as the decriminalization of marijuana or contests "three-
strikes you're out" legislation, union dues can be impressed to
serve this objective.223 Depending on the amount of noncore dues
payments required to fund this goal and other associated costs, a
dues payer who dissents largely because of such noncore concerns
is not a comprehensive free rider, despite the presumptions of
Congress and the Court. Mathematically, this can be described by
assuming that NCFR (noncore free rider calculus) is negative
therefore raising the possibility that KFR (comprehensive free
rider calculus) is also negative in that case-thus demonstrating
that the objecting dues payer is a forced rider.
Additional examples also exist. For instance, where a union
seeks to restrict imports from abroad (in an attempt to increase
demand for American products and labor)2 2 4 marginalized mem-
bers of a predominately affective-oriented grouping22 5 of the union
can justifiably spurn the group goal. This is because the union goal
causes nonexcludable external costs (e.g. reduced employment for
the identifiable members of the subgroup who are non-union
223. One observer notes that organized labor in California used union dues to oppose
the "three strikes you're out" initiative and to support the legalization of marijuana use. See
Press Release, Project 21, supra note 104. In each instance, the union position was very un-
popular with the black community. Id. Despite the unpopularity of these goals within the
community, black union members through their dues were compelled to financially sup-
port these stands. Id
224. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMIcS 459 (2d ed. 1997).
225. The intensity of the level and predominance of affective-orientation may increase
"when differences of culture, ethnicity, or race coincide with class differences-when the
members of minority groups are also economically subordinated." MICHAEL WALZER, ON
TOLERATION 56 (1997).
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members), coupled with elevated internal costs (the disutility de-
rived from the concern for the welfare of non-union members of
the economically subordinated ethnic group) that accrue directly
to minority members of the union. So the net utility or benefit of
this specific collective goal is negative because the benefits of in-
dependence exceed the benefits of cooperation. Funding this
collective goal through mandatory union dues demands that mi-
nority group members with an interest in the lives of their kin
submerge their identity, incur affective-oriented costs, and redis-
tribute their income in support of a policy that is detrimental to
their interests.
226
Analogously, by the latter part of this century most protective
labor legislation, which applied only to women, restricted the abil-
ity of women to compete in the labor market both in Europe and
the United States.2 7 Much of the legislation was enacted by a coali-
tion which included labor leaders and others.228 Opposition came
from, among others, suffragists and women's rights advocates.
Should a postmodern feminist union member who opposes cur-
rent proposed protective labor legislation because of its adverse
economic and sociological effects on those of her own gender be
obligated to pay dues in support of this goal merely because the
union leadership promotes such laws? Unless the union recognizes
and defers to her goals and identity, and acts in her interest, she
cannot plausibly be seen as noncore free rider. On the contrary,
she is a forced rider since her interests and the interests of those
for whom she is concerned are subordinated to the "greater
good."
In all these instances, overprovision of the collective good as
well as forced riding is possible. The beneficiaries of marijuana
decriminalization or import restraints include individuals who are
not members and do not pay dues to fund these objectives. Ac-
cordingly, resources are transferred from dissenters to union
leaders and their objectives, which they use to benefit individuals
and groups who fail to bear the full cost of attaining these goals.
It is possible that even the majority fails to share the noncore
goals of the union leadership and yet finds the cost of removing an
226. For a discussion of the regressive effects of import restraints on the distribution of
income, and their negative effects generally, see Hutchison, Distributional Consequences, su-
pra, note 216, at 1785-91.
227. See PamelaJ. Nickless & James D. Whitney, Protective Labor Legislation and Women's
Employment, in INTRODUCING RACE AND GENDER INTO ECONOMlIcs 31, 31 (Robin L. Bartlett
ed., 1997).
228. Id. at 32.
229. See id. at 31.
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offensive leader greater than the disutility of forced riding. This is
especially true where union corruption 3 0 abounds and union de-
mocracy flounders. 21 ' Thus the leadership may remain entrenched
and union democracy may remain a faint hope, despite the refusal
of the leadership to share the public/collective goals of the major-
ity.2 132 This illustration demonstrates the plausibility of Dennis
Mueller's claim that: "Where the benefits from collective action
are not the same across all group members, 'there is a systematic ten-
dency for "exploitation" of the great by the small.' ,233 In sum, while the
"commonality of the goals of an interest group's members makes
the achievement of these goals a public good for the group, and
thus gives rise to the same incentives to free-ride as exist in all pub-
lic good ... situations, 2 34 it is equally true that the lack of
commonality of goals among an interest group's members pro-
duces the identical incentive on the part of the union leadership to
free ride as well. Thus, the Taft-Hardey Act's circumscribed con-
ception of the free rider and the Supreme Court's affirmation of
that conception intensify the possibility that union leaders and a mi-
nority of union members allied with them free ride, while a majority of
union members persist as forced riders. To the extent this is true,
the assertion that all union goals necessitate fully allocated dues
payment from all members is fundamentally flawed. This descrip-
tion also underscores the emerging impression that union
members and workers as a whole refuse to accept the proposition
that conventional unions are the best vehicles for fostering their
interest.
230. See Macey, supra note 70, at 386; see also Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union
Democracy, and the Market for Union Contro 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 367, 368 (noting that even
staunch union supporters blanche over the autocracy, entrenchment, and corruption of
some union leaders).
231. See e.g., Macey, supra note 70, at 386; Schwab, supra note 230, at 367. See generally
Hadley et al., supra note 197.
232. The calculus of removing entrenched union leadership will likely include the
disutility of insults, physical threats to safety, and other forms of intimidation. See Knollen-
berg, supra note 54, at 364-65; supra notes 102, 108 and accompanying text.
233. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 309 (quoting MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION 29 (1965)). If this argument is persuasive, the real free riders are simply union
leaders.
234. Id. at 308; see also Petro, supra note 168, at 511-13 (arguing that union free riders
are actually forced riders).
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F Deficiencies in the Supreme Court's
and Congress's Free Rider Analysis
The Supreme Court's and Congress's free rider analysis is defec-
tive in several respects. First, it assumes, contrary to public choice
theory and the postmodern project that all workers benefit equally
from core collective bargaining activities.2 s5 This assumption appears
to be grounded in the dominant, yet not fully proved, hypothesis
that unions provide economic benefits to all members.236 Second, it
fails to take into account the possibility that non-objectors may free
ride at the expense of both ideological and core dues objectors. In
other words, those with a cooperation deficit subsidize those with a
high cooperation surplus as the payoff to independent action by
objectors exceeds the value of cooperation. Legally permissible
compulsory dues payment suggests government endorsement of an
involuntary union enforcement mechanism 237 that punishes non-
free riders for assumed free-riding behavior. 2 m Third, even though
intimidating exit barriers exist,239 and even though union corrup-
tion and autocracy persevere,2 ° the Court fails to suggest a solution
to the fact that at least some union members (those who do not
formally object and resign from the union) lack a commonality of
interest with other union members and union officials.
The aggregate consequence of each of these inadequacies is the
suppression of the varied diversity of viewpoints that exist in a plu-
ralistic society. Given the social and bureaucratic power harnessed
235. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 748-49 (1988) (accepting
that in the absence of a compulsory contribution scheme, all workers could reap the bene-
fits of unionization without in any way contributing financial support to the union).
236. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
237. One reason why cooperation continues in spite of incentives to defect and free
ride is that organizations create mechanisms to seek out and discipline or punish defectors.
Such mechanisms can include criticism, ostracism, and perhaps intimidation. The objective
of such enforcement is to increase the cooperation-defection differential-that is to in-
crease the shared benefits of cooperation by increasing the cost of defection and
accordingly reducing the attractiveness of independent action. See Posner, supra note 10, at
139-42.
238. In other words, those individuals and subgroups whose group cooperation surplus
is negative because the benefits of independence exceed the benefits of cooperation may
be required to pay some dues. While such enforcement methods may plausibly increase
asserted group "solidarity," such unity cannot be seen as "real" cooperation. Enforcement
mechanisms which can be seen as voluntary yet enforce group cooperation norms and re-
duce the benefits of independence are seen as essential in ensuring group solidarity. See id.
239. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
240. See Schwab, supra note 230, at 368.
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to entrenched leadership within the union movement,14' and in
light of the lack of commonality of interest, the Supreme Court
and Congress's free rider analysis inescapably reifies hierarchy and
242
subordination.
Although the Supreme Court and Congress assume that private
sector labor unions organize to pursue one objective (the im-
proved economic bargaining power of workers), once the large
initial costs of organization have been overcome, unions have the
power and tendency to engage in additional activities which may be
of interest to their members and which may plausibly improve the
position of workers or the welfare of society generally.243 Assertedly,
in "every case the driving force behind the formation of an interest
group is the belief that its members have common interests and
goals."24 4 And yet, that assumption, as the hypothetical model and
accompanying illustrations have demonstrated, is inconsistent with
basic public choice and postmodern analysis.
CONCLUSION
Building on the twin presumptions of free riding and solidarity,
union advocates and unions have increasingly sought a sweeping
interpretation of the social and political meaning of union dues.
These twin misconceptions have buttressed assertions that labor
unions have not only the power and right to speak for all workers
as part of a class-based war for social justice, but have also served as
grounds for contending that unions and the labor movement have
the right to demand that union dues be impressed into the service
of nonmembers and hegemonic ideologies. While union members
241. See Hadley et al., supra note 197, at 417-21. Union leaders in bureaucratized un-
ions are often able to retain office without being responsive to the members. See id, at 421.
Additionally, unions can be conceived of as mini-legislatures analogous to American de-
mocracy in that they operate under some form of "pluralism," whereby the policies chosen
are the outcome of negotiations and competition among numerous political groups. See,
e.g., MASHAW, supra note 180, at 15-16. This is a rather benign view. On the other hand, as
one observer points out, employees who take on the union establishment find the process
marked by numerous forms of intimidation. See Knollenberg, supra note 54, at 364. Such
intimidation, in my view, is inconsistent with a benign view of union "democracy."
242. Simultaneously, Congress and the Court fail to accord meaningful emphasis to the
values of human autonomy and human dignity and freedom. For some employees the only
escape from the Court's incomplete conception of the free rider-and the forced riding it
implies-requires more than resignation from the union; it obliges them to abort the em-
ployment relationship altogether.
243. See MUELLER, supra note 1, at 308-09.
244. Id. at 308. Even celebrated law and economics scholars seem to uncritically accept
this assumption. See POSNER, supra note 222, at 354.
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have opposed the use of such monies for political and ideological
purposes, their opposition has been largely scorned by those who
see unions and themselves as part of a movement against social
exclusion. Paradoxically, those workers who find the preferred col-
lective goals antithetical to their identity discover that they and
their interests are often excluded and ignored. As public choice
theory, and a limited investigation of union corruption 45 and un-
ion bureaucracy imply', it is possible that even the majority of labor
union members will find the goals of the leadership unappealing.
Despite this possibility, union expenditures for political pur-
poses per union member in the United States continue to rise,"6
thus raising the Orwellian possibility that all workers and leaders
are equal but some are more equal than others.247 Resolving that
issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Declarations of coopera-
tion among workers who supposedly share meaningful attributes
often defy coherence. Accordingly, much work needs to be done
to cultivate a defensible statutory and interpretative conception of
union dues, free riding, and forced riding.
Meanwhile, proponents of the labor union movement's impulse
to attain the "universal good," premised upon a conception of
homogenized preferences, must justify their vision against Thomas
Jefferson's contention that "to compel a man to furnish contribu-
tion of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical. 2 4 Given the diversity of identi-
ties that are obtainable in a pluralistic society, it may be the task of
the postmodern project to reclaim that conviction.
245. See Schwab, supra note 230, at 368.
246. See Knollenberg, supra note 54, at 350.
247. SeeMUELLER, supra note 1, at 307-19.
248. Knollenberg, supra note 54, at 373 (citing THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, at xvii (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988)).
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